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1.1 Cultural values and international management 
The rapid pace of globalisation leads to strategic advantages for companies that understand 
the value of culture, a word of which there are numerous definitions. One of the more popular 
is Hofstede’s: “Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 25). There are two opposite 
lenses through which theorists as well as practitioners look at culture. According to 
divergence theory, global differences in value systems, behaviour, economic development and 
distribution of wealth conserves a state of cultural diversity in the world (Warner and Joynt, 
2002). In contrast, convergence theory assumes that globalisation leads to a homogenisation 
of cultures, which in turn affects management, thereby making efforts to enhance cross-
cultural competence superfluous 
 
(ibid.).  
Older research shows that companies tend to internationalise gradually by choosing culturally, 
often also geographically, close markets as a first stop (Johansson and Wiederheim-Paul, 
1975; Johansson and Vahlne, 1977). However, this is challenged by the shifting economic 
balance in the world, as the rapid economic growth in the BRIC
1
-countries together with the 
saturation of home markets have made many Western companies look further away when 
internationalising. Also, the so called born globals view the world as their business arena 
from the beginning (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). The question is, does this imply that the 
importance of national cultures is fading off, as would be expected from convergence theory? 
Noted work within cultural values research suggests otherwise. 
Many of the most prominent studies of national cultures and management focus on national 
cultural values (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars, 1993, the GLOBE project, 2004). Taras et 
al. (2009) go as far as to claim that national values sometimes better explain a person’s 
workplace behaviour than both age, gender, level of education and even personality. On the 
contrary, Gerhart and Fang (2005) argue that the role of national cultural values is 
exaggerated by researchers, and may in fact be less significant than for example the effect of 
parts of the national institutional environment or organisational culture. Cultural values 
                                                          
1
 BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China 
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research is also criticised for failing to recognize agency, i.e. that individuals can shape their 
environment (Braun and Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002).  
Hence, the views and accounts of how national cultures impact on management are 
conflicting, which marks a challenge for companies when planning for internationalisation. 
This especially holds true for the designing of IHRM strategies. 
1.1.1 Strategic international human resource management  
HRM is arguably the management function that is most affected by culture (Braun and 
Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002), thereby it’s critical that companies can create culturally 
informed strategies for this function. Gerhart and Fang (2005) argue that globalisation has 
created a discussion about the effects of national environments - in addition to such contextual 
factors as company size and industry - on strategic human resource management (SHRM). 
SHRM is used to coordinate HR policies and practices and incorporate them in the company’s 
overall business strategy, thus creating strategic management processes. Strategic 
international human resource management (SIHRM) is the integration of such coordinated 
HR activities to a company’s international strategy (Taylor, Beechler, Napier, 1996). The key 
challenge is to create IHRM strategies that give the benefits of global efficiency while 
simultaneously being responsive to the local environment (Schuler et al. 2002).  
Kaput and Singh (1988) argue that companies are concerned with their ability to manage 
subsidiaries when going international. The degree of concern is a result of (1) whether their 
own culture fosters low or high levels of uncertainty avoidance, and (2) the cultural distance 
between the national cultures involved. This suggests that IHRM strategies are especially 
important when entering a culturally distant market, which marks an interesting challenge to 
companies in regions with supposedly high cultural distance between nations. 
Although company size is recognized as one of the context-specifics that have to inform 
SIHRM, most of the research in the field focuses on multinationals (ibid.) while little is 
known about SIHRM in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, lack of 
management skills is noted as a common reason for SME foreign venture failure (e.g. Scullion 
and Linehan, 2005; The European Commission, 2008). Overall, the smaller the firm, the less 
likely it is to a) have clear strategies, and b) to internationalise (The European Commission, 
2005). Simultaneously, the idea of SME internationalisation as a key to economic growth and 
global innovation has gained support from the academic world as well as from governments 
and intergovernmental organisations. Many governments have programmes for SME 
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internationalisation in addition to export programmes. These might focus on network 
building, innovation or provision of real estate. Very few – if any – offer support for 
international human resource management, even though this function is noted as critical for 
overseas success.  
In conclusion, the above leads to the following premises; (1) a strategy for IHRM gives an 
advantage in the internationalisation process, and  (2) cross-cultural competence is central to 
forming a successful, implementable and flexible strategy, and (3) when there is high cultural 
distance and low familiarity between countries, companies might need support in order to 
shape such strategies. 
1.2 Problem discussion 
The reality of globalisation has since long overtaken the idea of gradual internationalisation. 
Rather than implying that this makes the question of cultural distance obsolete, new 
internationalisation patterns forces us to pay careful attention to culture in arguably more 
culturally distant markets. Management issues regarding cultural differences between Western 
economies and the BRIC-countries have frequented business literature over the last decade. 
For example, there is on abundance of research on Chinese human resource management 
(Lamond and Zheng, 2010). One of the lessons from this research is that the culturally 
charged Chinese celebration of the paradox gives room for many interpretations of context-
responsive HRM strategies, all though Western companies benefit from understanding how 
Confucian ethics permeates all of Chinese society, including management (Warner, 2009). 
Indian HRM is marked by the traditional caste system, lack of collective bargaining,  and 
pressures to adopt Western management. Also, spiritual frameworks such as the connection 
between the desa-kala-patra (location-time-circumstances) and the gunas 
(attractions/orientations) elements are used to assess manager as well as employee actions and 
relationships (Chatterjee, 2007). Companies who are considering entry on these two markets 
can study the countries’ history to find spiritual ideas that are echoed in modern HRM. 
However, the confusion of what marks ‘Russian’ as opposed to ‘Soviet’ cultural values makes 
these spiritual ideas that inform management are more difficult to find in Russia. Also, 
management in Russia has not quite received the upsurge in interest that could be expected, 
which means that companies who want to enter the Russian market are less likely to find 
guidance in academic research when shaping their IHRM strategies for this market. The most 
noted research on the subject is from as far back as the 1990’s (e.g. May et al., 1998; 
Naumov, 1996, Elenkov, 1998), an era in which the country experienced rapid societal and 
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economic changes as a result of the Communist system breakdown. This calls for an update of 
Russian management research. 
Russia is the geographically closest BRIC-economy for Scandinavian enterprises, making it a 
potentially attractive market. However, the Scandinavian countries and Russia have proved to 
be opposites in cultural values research (Inspireimagineinnovate.com, 2007) which inclines 
that cultural distance between the countries is high. Russia is also noted as a country whose 
business culture is hard to penetrate for Western companies. Macro-environmental obstacles 
for co-operation are said to be legal uncertainty and incomprehensible bureaucracy because of 
high level corruption (Bdoconsulting.com, 2012), protectionism (Reuters.com, 2012), the 
degree of personal relationships necessary to strike deals, and unclearness in what constitutes 
an agreement as well as ownership of assets (Worldbusinessculture.com, 2013). All in all, 
these factors suggest that entry on the Russian market is simultaneously desirable and 
frightening for Scandinavian companies. This opens up to a discussion of how these 
companies should gain the cross-cultural competence needed to create successful HRM 
strategies for this market. Arguably, companies – especially SMEs – need more support to 
internationalise in culturally distant markets, which calls for the culturally affected HRM 
function to become a prioritised point for support. However, the connection between SIHRM 
and business internationalisation support programmes doesn’t seem to be common in practice, 
neither is it established in research. Are the companies being pro-active themselves, or do 
they – especially SMEs - need support? Can governmental internationalisation support 
programmes inform and alleviate such company specific processes as the creation of IHRM 
strategies? Most importantly, can they help companies overcome cultural distance?  
1.3 Study purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore (1) the effect of high cultural distance on the shaping of 
international human resource management strategies, and (2) if a business support 
organisation can be helpful in the process of facilitating these. In order to fulfil my purpose I 
have to begin by researching how the cultural distance manifests itself in the daily life of 
Scandinavian-Russian organisations. 
Research question 1: What IHRM strategies can be found in Scandinavian companies who 
have entered the Russian market, and in which ways does cultural distance influence the 
strategies? 
Research question 2: How can an internationalisation support organisation inform the 
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process of developing IHRM strategies in these companies? 
 
2. Method 
In this chapter, the process of writing the thesis will be presented. I will begin by clarifying 
what the thesis does and doesn’t attempt to study. Before any of the steps of the research 
process can be presented and discussed, I will explain the factors that influenced my choice of 
research area. Following this, the research process will be outlined, and the steps in the 
research process will be connected to literature on scientific method in business and 
management studies. The reasons to study a case using qualitative method will be described 
and evaluated. I will then go on to explain how the research problem was generated, show 
how subsequent sampling was done, and account for the data collection method and the 
subsequent analysis of the results. Finally, there will be a discussion about the quality of the 
research.  
2.1 Clarifications 
Country-clustering: The reasoning for treating the Scandinavian countries (i.e. Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark) collectively is the relatively small differences between the 
national cultures within Scandinavia. This choice is justified by the vastness and diversity of 
the object of comparison, Russia, with its multitude of peoples, cultures and religions. 
Country-clustering on the basis of attitudes of the countries’ populations is not uncommon, 
and the Scandinavian countries usually get placed in the same category (e.g. Hofstede 1982; 
GLOBE, 2004) Thus, there is arguably good reason for treating Scandinavia as one unity in 
international management studies. 
Focus on Russian culture: The purpose of this study is not to compare theories on 
Scandinavian culture and management with the accounts of the participants. Thus, the 
literature will focus on Russian culture and management, only occasionally covering aspects 
of Scandinavian ditto. The principal group of readers of this study are assumed to be familiar 
with the common traits of the latter. 
Cultural layers covered: My aim is to investigate how Scandinavian and Russian culture co-
exists within an organisation as opposed to in a seller-buyer relationship. Therefore, business 
culture will not be central to the study. However, the divergence between Scandinavian and 
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Russian business culture carries with it implications that shape both conceptions and the 
reality of organisational culture, and will at times be brought up. 
Cultural and psychic distance: These terms are often used interchangeably in research (Sousa 
and Bradley, 2006). I have chosen to use the term ‘cultural distance’ also when referring to 
works where the other term is used, in cases where the phenomenon described is the same. 
2.2 Research area 
The relative lack of interest in Russian management in current business research is arguably 
the first argument for studying it, and the scarceness of studies comparing Russian 
management to other styles than American, or the more generic “Western” management 
makes Scandinavia a theoretically interesting object of comparison.  Theoretical interest 
guided me to search within the broad research fields of HRM and internationalisation. My 
preference for interpersonal relationships over numbers and statistics is evident in me 
choosing the subject of HRM, which is also researched in the field of sociology. This subject 
would me to analyse the experienced instead of the ‘hard facts’. Personal interest in Russian 
language, history and culture made me investigate the state of current research on Russian 
management. Researchers’ personal values and experiences affect their research choices 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). Being Scandinavian and having an interest in Russia, my pre-
understanding of cultural conditions in these countries was deemed beneficial. Choosing 
Scandinavian companies was also a consequence of the greater likeliness of gaining access to 
cases to study. Since much attention has been paid to discussing macro level factors causing 
Scandinavian – or indeed other Western – companies to fail with their Russian ventures, the 
research problem sprung out of the necessity of also evaluating micro level factors that affect 
cross-cultural cooperation between Russians and Scandinavians in cases where obstacles on 
the macro level are overcome. 
As made clear from the above, the reasons for choosing the research area are theoretical and 
practical interest as well as personal experience and interests. As will be explained later, the 
chosen research area was later connected to the research area of networks, to make a better fit 
with the chosen case. In the early phase however, an interest for internationalisation, HRM 
and Russian management spawned the idea of finding a research problem connected to these 
fields. Subsequently, I found that there was a research gap in current cross-cultural 
management literature, and proceeded to search for relevant theories and previous research.  
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2.2.1 Literature search 
The chosen research area called for an extensive literature search. In the beginning of this 
process, I focused mainly on previous empirical findings, i.e. articles in which Russian culture 
and management, cross-cultural management and IHRM had been studied. I organised the 
literature after research problems to spot any reoccurring themes. I also used previous studies, 
working papers, and student theses to find out which theories were most often used.  Most of 
the theories I considered are mid-range theories, i.e. theories that are more specific and less 
abstract than grand theories, but still seek to explain and understand aspects of an object of 
study as opposed to pure empirical findings (Bryman and Bell, 2011). However, I decided to 
let both theories and previous empirical findings be part of the theoretical framework, 
supported by the notion that the latter is “conditioned by and directed towards the research 
questions that arise out of an interrogation of the literature” and that “the literature acts as a 
proxy for theory. In many instances, theory is latent or implicit in the literature” (ibid, p.10). 
Cultural values and  management  
I began my literature search within the field of cross-cultural management, and found that 
much of the noted work used cultural dimensions or referred to previous studies using this 
method. This is one of the reasons why I chose to focus on how cultural values affect 
management. I went on to search for articles on Russian management, and found that many of 
these had also used cultural dimensions measuring. I decided to concentrate on these at it 
would be a way of comparing cultural values shaping management between countries. From 
literature reviews, I could tell that the most noted research on Russian management was from 
the 1990’s, i.e. less than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hence, many of the 
articles focus on differences rather than similarities. A reoccurring theme was the difference 
in mentality between Russians and ‘Westerners’ (few articles compare Scandinavian and 
Russian management) rather than labour laws, the level of skills or working procedures. This 
strengthened my decision to focus on cultural values. Once I decided upon a case to study, I 
found that there were other research fields that had to be considered for the theoretical 
framework, and thus decided not to search for cultural dimensions studies of Scandinavian 
management. An inclusion of the latter would give the study too heavy a focus on culture.  
Strategic international human resource management 
I looked for research on HRM, and subsequently found the research field of SIHRM. The idea 
of HRM as a strategic tool at the point of internationalisation further sharpened the research 
problem. This made me focus not only on how the cross-cultural management turns out 
14 
 
(practices), but also on how companies plan for it (the strategy). However, I quickly found 
that much of the research in this field focuses on MNCs, which makes theories little 
applicable on SMEs. I picked out articles that dealt with IHRM strategies in relation to both 
culture and to the phases of internationalisation. The latter was a result of wanting a balanced 
theoretical framework that offers other explanations than degree of cultural compatibility as to 
why companies choose one particular IHRM strategy, or none at all. The outcome of the 
literature search on SIHRM is that theories and previous research could mostly be used to 
describe the actions of MNCs, and possibly SMEs with ambitious internationalisation 
strategies. Since I was also interested in smaller companies, I had to look elsewhere for 
literature on IHRM in SMEs. I looked for research with this focus within the field of SME 
internationalisation literature, but did not find any theories that dealt exclusively with IHRM 
strategies for SMEs.  
Networks 
Later on in the process, after I had decided upon a case that included a business support 
organisation, I looked for literature on network participation (‘hard’ and ‘soft’ networks, 
strategic alliances and support networks) in the internationalisation process, and found that 
the field of SME internationalisation overlapped with the former. With the chosen case in 
mind, I focused on ‘soft’ support networks, and found that governmental internationalisation 
support programmes were rather common. I searched for articles on IHRM in relation to this, 
i.e. how support network participation can influence or inform IHRM. This seemed a less 
common theme: in fact I did not succeed to find any articles at all that dealt with this subject.  
For all of the different themes, I tried to find books (e.g. student literature) and literature 
reviews. These were consulted to make sure I hadn’t overlooked any important work within a 
field. In this way, I could also see if the literature I had chosen was relevant, and where it 
could be places in relation to other studies. One of the greatest challenges was to find theories 
that were relevant to all of the parts of the case and could provide a holistic framework: this 
proved impossible. Thus, the fit between case design and theoretical framework could have 
been better. However, the fact that theories and literature stem from different research fields 
case also makes theory triangulation, i.e. considering more than one theoretical position when 
interpreting data (Denzin, 1970), possible. 
In my literature search, I also searched for books and articles on research methods, and 
decided to turn mainly to Bryman and Bell’s “Business research methods” and Gummesson’s 
15 
 
“Qualitative methods in management research” since these are widely acclaimed, cover a 
wide range of themes, and focus specifically on methods for business and management 
research. 
 
2.3 Research strategy: qualitative research 
Since my aim was to explore a subject rather than quantify it, I opted for a qualitative research 
method. Bryman and Bell define qualitative research as “a research strategy that usually 
emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (2011, p. 
386). According to Gummesson, qualitative methodology and cases studies are valuable 
within business and management research (2000, p.1) and the author further claims that 
“studies in management are concerned with understanding and improving the performance of 
a business” (ibid p. 5). This is in line with my aim, which is to gain a deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms that shape cultural understanding and subsequent implementation of IHRM 
strategies in organisations. Because of the limitations carried by the inclusion of a specific 
mix of nationalities in the research question, the relatively few possible respondents would 
also make a quantitative approach rather risky. In a worst case scenario, I could have ended 
up getting few and unsubstantial answers and thus only “scraping the surface” of a problem 
that was neither particularly applicable. I did not want to discard the geographical limitations 
as these were influenced by my pre-understanding and would hopefully add value to the 
study. 
 According to Gummesson, the risk of data collected through qualitative methods is that is 
based on subjective interpretations and are thereby possibly less scientifically acceptable 
(ibid, p.126). The level to which subjective beliefs influence research is by some seen as the 
dividing-line between positivism and hermeneutics, where the latter is deemed to be more 
dependent on cultural and personal beliefs (ibid, p. 18-19). Hermeneutics emphasises the 
importance of pre-understanding in shaping new theory. In the hermeneutic circle (or ‘spiral 
as some prefer to call it), the parts of a phenomenon are interpreted to make sense of it. As 
Gummesson puts it, “A lack of pre-understanding will cause the researcher/consultant to 
spend considerable time gathering basic information (…)” (ibid, p. 58). Arguably then, my 
interpretation of theory as well as findings would be more valuable if I chose a research area 
with which I am familiar. In conclusion, a qualitative method was deemed more fruitful and 
realistic for the purpose of this study than a quantitative method. This would also enable a 
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qualitative interpretational approach. 
2.3.1 Interpretational approach 
Ontology is “a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being” 
(Merriam-webster.com) It deals with the relationship between social entities (e.g. 
organisations and culture) and the social actors who experience them (Bryman and Bell, 2011, 
p.21-22). The dividing line is whether social phenomena is viewed as reality independent of 
human perceptions of it (objectivism) or instead the shifting result of perceptions made by 
those who experience it (consctructionism) (ibid, p. 23).  This study is guided by the 
constructionist approach, i.e. there is no way of objectively describing what a culture is or 
isn’t. The premise is that Russian and Scandinavian culture – and the respective management 
styles – have to be interpreted through the eyes of the respondents, instead of being viewed as 
objective realities. However, the theoretical framework does consist of quantitative studies 
that have attempted to measure and compare cultures. The results from these provide some of 
the common perceptions of a culture by those who are considered to belong to it, which 
justifies the inclusion of them. Understanding how individual perceptions shape respondents’ 
answers is crucial to analysing empirical data in all research, but particularly when using 
qualitative methods. Therefore, the respondents’ statements were analysed in light of their 
values, views and experiences.  
All though the terms respondents and informants are sometimes used interchangeably, 
informants provide information and explain certain phenomena while respondents share their 
own reflections and thoughts on a particular subject. With my aim in mind, I needed the 
providers of data to take on both these roles. To keep matters simple, I will refer to them as 
respondents throughout the thesis. Respondents’ personal attitudes and beliefs, and their pre-
understanding of the theme for the interview, influences their answers.  Considering that all of 
the respondents represent companies, it is also necessary to understand how their liability not 
to act against what can be perceived as the shared beliefs, rules, and norms of their 
organisations is likely to affect their statements. This aspect is also taken into account in the 
analysis of the findings.  
The whole research process is in various ways coloured by the personal beliefs by the 
researchers who conducted it, even though it is expected not to be (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Bryman and Bell argue that the idea of ‘value-free’ research is nothing but an illusion, but the 
researcher must in turn be able to be reflexive about the effect of personal values and 
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experiences on research conclusions by outlining and discussing this aspect in their research 
(ibid, p. 30). The illusion of ‘value-free’ research might be particularly problematic to uphold  
in research of culture, which is a sensitive subject. This is especially true if the researcher is 
‘culturally biased’ in belonging to one of the cultures but not the other. I have been 
particularly careful to include Russians as well as non-Russians, to discuss positive and 
negative sides to both cultures, and to put management styles in relation to context by asking 
the respondents not only what they think of Russian and Scandinavian management styles, but 
also how appropriate they are depending on context.  
Another point that the researcher needs to be reflexive about is the choice of aspects to study. 
As this is a study of IHRM, there is a possible risk that human resources would be viewed as 
more important than for example financial resources at the point of internationalisation. I have 
tried to eliminate this risk by not quantifying the impact of IHRM strategies, comparing it to 
other critical factors in the internationalisation, or inclining any causal relationships between 
successful IHRM strategies and overall internationalisation success. This is in line with the 
qualitative research strategy.  
2.3.3 Inductive and deductive approaches 
Qualitative method is usually coupled with an inductive approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 
27) i.e. that its purpose is to use empirical data to generate theory rather than to test existing 
theory on ‘reality’, as with a deductive approach (ibid.). A study can comprise elements of 
both (ibid. p,28), e.g. that theory is tested and the observations made generate new theory or 
builds on the existent (ibid, p. 11). This is called abduction. As stated earlier, I chose a subject 
of which there was a gap in current management research, and did not find any recently 
emerged theories that needed testing. Thus, I used a mostly inductive approach. The theories 
in the theoretical framework of this study were not directly tested at any point, but were rather 
used to inform the whole research process. This knowledge allowed me to pick up common 
themes and sensitise the interview questions, and provided a backdrop against which the 
results can be compared and contrasted.  
2.4.3 Forming the research problem 
The exact research question was not formed until I could apply my research problem to a real-
life case. With SIVA (NB. Introduction on the next page) in the case, I could focus on 
examining not only the companies’ IHRM strategies (or possibly lack thereof) but also 
SIVA’s role in raising cultural awareness that could benefit the companies. In his book 
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“Qualitative Methods in Management Research”, Gummesson explains the difference 
between basic and applied research. While the first is concerned primarily with using 
empirical data in order to add to theory, applied research is close to consultancy, and focuses 
on finding possible solutions to problems facing a specific company or industry (ibid.). My 
goal was to find a research problem that could carry both these ambitions. Once a case was 
found, I chose to alter the theoretical framework for the study to include the aspect of 
internationalisation support organisation. This served to make a better match between theory 
and the case. In addition to relating to the case, I found that theories on network participation 
(e.g. support networks) also dealt largely with SME internationalisation, which compensated 
for the gap of SME research in the SIHRM literature. In conclusion, four factors: personal 
interest and pre-understanding; an apparent knowledge gap in research; relevance to broader 
management research and theories and applicability to real-life cases were instrumental in my 
selection of an appropriate research problem.  
2.4 Sampling 
2.4.1 Identifying cases 
Since no distinction of management styles within Scandinavia were made, companies of any 
Scandinavian nationality could be sampled. However, as the Barents region is a natural 
geographical meeting point for Scandinavian and Russian business, the focus was put 
primarily on finding Norwegian companies. All though Finland shares the longest border with 
Russia, the linguistic and cultural proximity to Norway is a factor that influenced the 
conclusion that it would be easier to find Norwegian respondents. Also, previous personal 
knowledge about Norwegian institutions (educational, governmental, business networks) 
working with Russian-Norwegian business interaction strengthened this conclusion.  
Norwegian business consultants in Russia, Innovation Norway, The Norwegian Barents 
secretariat, Norwegian universities with Russian exchange in the fields of Energy and 
Business Economics are among the sources that were consulted for tips on companies that 
might fit the criteria. Using online search engines, approximately 20 companies from all of 
the Scandinavia were contacted directly. They received an e-mail with a description of the 
study idea, and were given the opportunity to partake either via a personal meeting, 
telephone/Skype or e-mail. The preferability of a personal interview was stressed, with the 
estimated interview time of 30 minutes to one hour mentioned. They were informed that their 
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identities would not be disclosed. A number of the companies were also contacted via 
telephone if no answer had been received after 2-3 days.  
In addition to the companies, I contacted SIVA, a state-owned Norwegian organisation that 
supports the internationalisation of Norwegian companies, once I found out that they have an 
office in Murmansk, Russia. I requested a complimentary interview about their experiences of 
how Norwegian companies deal with HRM in their Russian ventures, and about if/how SIVA 
gets involved in these processes. I received an affirmative answer, and was invited to visit 
SIVAs office in Murmansk to conduct interviews and partake in activities for a week in the 
middle of December. The study trip was organised and sponsored by SIVA. I decided to make 
a multiple-case study of Scandinavian companies in Murmansk. 
2.4.2 Selection of location  
For Norway, higher degree cooperation with Russia is an official national goal. The 
Norwegian government’s High North Strategy as of 2006 states that Russia is a natural and 
strategic partner for Norway for reasons of trade, culture, petroleum extraction, the 
environment, indigenous peoples and more (The Norwegian government, 2006). This makes 
the Russian town of Murmansk, a 300 000 population port town some 250 kilometres from 
the Norwegian-Russian border a natural centre for governmental cross-border cooperation 
programmes. When SIVA opened its first office abroad in 1999, the location was Murmansk. 
The organisation is still present in the town and continues to help Norwegian companies 
establish themselves in Russia.  
The border region is sparsely populated on both sides, and both Murmansk oblast
2
 and the 
three counties of Northern Norway are located far away from the financial centres of their 
respective countries. One positive outcome of a higher degree of cross-border business 
interaction is that is can lead to highly needed jobs on both sides. There is also a possibility of 
future oil and gas extraction in the Arctic waters from both countries, which is a high risk 
activity, thus creating a need for cooperation on development of environmentally responsible 
technology and work procedures. Collectively, these factors create a strong incentive for 
Norwegian and Russian businesses to try and eliminate obvious macro level obstacles to 
cross-border trade, such as big differences in business culture and laws regulating business. 
The question is, once these are sufficiently dealt with, what are the micro level obstacles for 
                                                          
2
 Oblast is a Russian administrative division roughly corresponding to ‘province’ 
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cooperation, and how are they dealt with in cross-cultural organisations? This made 
companies in the Barents region an interesting population. 
2.4.4 An overview of Norwegian business activity in Murmansk 
The land border between Norway and Russia is 196 km long, but it is perhaps the maritime 
borderline in the Barents Sea, over which the two countries only recently (2011) settled a 
long-time twist, that has driven business exchange in the region. For both Norway and Russia, 
this area is strategically important for oil and gas extraction. After Norwegian oil giant Statoil 
was shortlisted as a partner in developing the gigantic arctic gas field Shtokman 
(Gazprom.com, 2005), Norwegian companies rushed to the Murmansk region to secure a 
strategic position. When development was postponed, the short-intentioned companies left, 
while others found ways of staying in business. In that respect, the surge for Norwegian 
companies to go to Murmansk is not as big today as it was a few years ago. Also, Murmansk 
is listed as one of the more difficult Russian cities for foreign companies to do business in 
(The World Bank, 2012).  
2.4.5 Selection of companies 
Having decided on making the study on location in Murmansk, the sample became limited to 
Scandinavian companies active in the region. I looked primarily for Norwegian companies; 
approximately 15-20 companies fit the criteria, a few of which I had contacted previously. 
SIVA helped me in forwarding my request and to book interviews. As HRM plays a part in 
every company with employees, companies were accepted independent of industry. Inclusion 
of a variety of industries would also reduce the likelihood of painting an unbalanced picture 
based on industry specifics.  
Two of the companies are SMEs, one is a major company, and one is an MNC.  Two of the 
companies had more than one Russian branch. Two of the companies are tenants at the Polar 
Star Innovation Centre. Neither of them is incubated. All of the respondents have worked for 
2 years or longer at their companies. All of the companies have been established in Murmansk 
3 years or longer. Two of the companies rent office space in SIVAs facilities, while the 
remaining have contact with other Norwegian companies and SIVA through business interest 
groups. One of the companies is not Norwegian, but originally Scandinavian. Since no further 
distinction between management styles and institutional environment in the Scandinavian 
countries is taken into account in this study, the specific Scandinavian nationality of the 
company is not essential. This serves to justify the inclusion of a non-Norwegian company.  
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2.4.7 Selection of respondents 
At first, I set rather narrow criteria regarding position, with the result of a very limited 
population. Preferred respondents were managers or HR staff, since it is likely that they 
would have the most experience of the issues central to the study. However, having set the 
geographical location as a boundary, I concluded that the criteria for respondents’ experience 
and work position instead had to be widened in order to make possible a multitude-case study. 
An argument for this study design is that modern case studies of HR policies and practices in 
Scandinavian companies in Russia are so few that the aim at this point arguably should be to 
collect material that helps create an overview of how these have changed since the 1990’s, 
when Russia management research was numerous and had a higher profile. 
This would give the effect that more companies could partake in the study, since far from all 
of the companies had their HR function located in Murmansk, or indeed any formal HR 
function at all. Not all of the companies had their management placed in Murmansk, and 
some managers and HR professionals were busy during the time of my stay. I chose an 
inclusive approach, with the implication that respondents comprise managers as well as 
employees, and that not all respondents have cross-cultural experience (e.g. have worked in 
both countries). One of the company respondents is a West-European third country national 
(TCN) who has also lived and worked in Norway, while the three remaining respondents are 
Russian, with one of them having studied and worked in Norway earlier. The respondent from 
SIVA is the vice president of the international branch of the organisation. He has been 
responsible for SIVAs activities in Russia for almost 15 years, and is thereby a key source of 
expertise on Norwegian business internationalisation in Russia. The SIVA respondent was 
also my first point of contact at SIVA and contact person throughout the week in Murmansk. 
The identity of the respondents and the companies they work for will not be unveiled. To 
protect the identity of the company respondents, answers will be cross-reported. Cross-
reporting and analysing means that the reports of the respondents will be treated collectively, 
and that statements cannot be traced to specific respondents. The exception to this is the SIVA 
respondent, whose statements consist mainly of observations of Norwegian companies in 
Murmansk in general, which arguably makes the information less sensitive.  
Another difference between the company respondents and the SIVA respondent, is that the 
main purpose of the interviews with the former was to establish an overview of cross-cultural 
perceptions in Scandinavian-Russian work-place settings, while the focus for the latter was to 
gain information on how Scandinavian – or more specifically, Norwegian – companies act 
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regarding IHRM in practice, and what the role of the internationalisation support organisation 
is. In this way, the former are more like respondents while the latter first and foremost carries 
the role of an informant. 
2.5 Collection of data 
Semi-structured interviews were held with 5 respondents: 4 respondents from Scandinavian 
companies in Murmansk and 1 respondent from SIVA.  
2.5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
I decided to conduct semi-structured interviews. According to Gummesson, the researcher 
pays special attention to what the respondent considers of importance in semi-structured 
(informal) interviews (Gummesson, 2000, p.127). As stated earlier, the aim of the study is to 
provide an overview of existing policies, practices and attitudes. However, the way a person 
understands decision-making, attitudes of others, cultural and national differences is highly 
subjective, which requires an interactive approach in order to mirror the respondent’s mindset 
to communicate better. Also, the respondents held different job positions within the 
companies, and there are variations in size among the companies. This would most likely 
have heavy influence on their abilities to answer my questions. I decided that each interview 
had to be shaped by the individual respondent’s company, experience, understanding, 
interests and knowledge. Another factor that can influence respondents’ answers is the 
behaviour of the researcher during the interview. A couple of negative implications of 
qualitative interviews are, according to Gummesson, that they don’t provide information on: 
if the researcher has interviewed key respondents; non-verbal conversation (such as gestures, 
posture or facial expressions); whether the researcher has gained access to significant 
“quantitative data” such as archival material; informal contacts between the parts (i.e. outside 
the actual interview) (ibid, p. 128-129). Special emphasis has been put on these risk factors, 
since they all carry relevance to this study. They will all be part of the ending chapter, i.e. the 
discussion of the study.  
 
2.5.1 The companies 
This study makes no effort to research differences between industries. Therefore, the sectors 
that the companies are active in will not be revealed. The following presentations consist of 
basic facts, information given by the respondents, and information derived from official 
documents such as annual reports, company websites and job adverts. The interviews with the 
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company respondents were conducted in Murmansk in mid-December. I compiled an 
interview guide, which shifted depending on the position, nationality and employer of the 
individual respondent. The questions asked were informed by the theory and previous 
literature I had read, but also by information I had found about the companies. All 4 company 
interviews held in Murmansk were booked with the help of SIVA, i.e. SIVA forwarded my 
request together with a study description to companies in their network. The interview guide 
was not transmitted to the respondents beforehand, with the exception of one company, who 
requested to view a sample of the questions. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 
1,5 hours. Two of the interviews were conducted in one session. This did not seem to impact 
on the respondents’ openness, as they were familiar with one another from before, and the 
discussion during the interview meeting was not marked by consensus at all times. All 
respondents got to choose the location and were informed that their individual identities 
would not be revealed in the study, nor would the identities of the companies they work for. I 
also explained that I would transcribe the interviews and send them for approval within 
approximately a week.  
One possible implication of receiving external help in securing respondents is that SIVAs 
good contact with the companies possibly made them more instantly willing to take part. The 
other side to getting help in booking meetings is that a certain degree of control over the 
research process is lost, which is not per se something negative, as it is in fact a type of 
convenience or snowball sampling. However, it had the effect that I sometimes had little 
previous knowledge about the respondents and the companies, since some of the meetings 
were booked in short advance, and that the timing and location of interviews were not always 
ideal. This might have affected the quality of the interviews all though, arguably, the 
responsibility for possible gaps in the first interviews should be brought upon the researcher. 
Naturally, the interviews become better the latter in the research process they are conducted, 
as they are informed by previous interviews and revision of theory. I found that this was 
indeed true of the data collection for this study. 
2.5.2 The business support organisation  
The interview with Mr. Geir Reiersen, vice president of SIVA International, was conducted 
via Skype in early January. The interview lasted approximately 1 hour. Before this data was 
collected, the results from the company interviews had been thematised and partly analysed, 
which meant that these – and also informal conversations throughout the week in Murmansk - 
could inform this last interview. This turned out to be beneficial in making sure that both 
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theory and empirical data would influence the questions I asked. In this way, I could weigh 
the respondent’s accounts on the topics (i.e. how the companies deal with culture in their 
IHRM strategies and how SIVA is involved in this process) against my own impressions 
during the week in Murmansk. Even if the latter were only built on a few conversations, this 
did influence the interview in that I had a higher degree of pre-understanding than I would 
otherwise have had. If the interview process had been reverse, i.e. if the interview with the 
SIVA respondent had been conducted before I interviewed the companies, it is possible that 
results from the first interview would have coloured my view strongly. The SIVA respondent 
has after all worked closely with Norwegian businesses in Murmansk for almost 15 years, 
which means that his views and accounts are built on long-time experience. This would easily 
have affected my way of looking at the problem, since my knowledge in the area can in no 
way be compared to his. By first visiting SIVA and interviewing the companies, I could begin 
to analyse these results and revisit the theoretical framework before the last interview was 
conducted. This arguably ensured a more rewarding interview. After the interview was 
finished, I ensured the respondent that I would send him a transcript of the interview within 1-
3 days.  
Throughout the data collection process, all the interviews were transcribed and vaguely 
thematised within 1,5 weeks, and all of the respondents had the chance to go through the 
transcript of their interview in case they wanted to clarify anything, or take back any 
statements. I decided to be generous in this aspect even if important information could be lost. 
However, no such problems occurred, and clarifications were only made on two sentences all 
in all. By e-mailing them, I offered all the respondents the opportunity to contact me at any 
part of the research process. I informed them when the study would be published and offered 
to send a copy before or after publication. This technique of respondent validation is 
employed to avoid that the researcher’s perception of social reality distorts the data and 
becomes dominant (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 396). 
2.5.3 Analysis of data 
After all the interviews had been made, I proceeded to code the results. In this process, I 
scraped interview material that was not relevant to the research problem. As far as possible, I 
tried to find common themes for both the company interviews and the SIVA interview.  The 
themes were than compared and contrasted to themes in the theoretical framework. For every 
interview theme, I searched the theoretical framework to find out how the parts of it related to 
the findings. It became evident that the match between theory and data was not fully 
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accomplished: parts of the theoretical framework are not particularly relevant to the results, 
and some of the results are not covered by the theoretical framework. For example, the 
subject of language plays a bigger part in the findings than in the theoretical framework. 
Therefore I decided that it’s justified as a theme in the analysis chapter. On the whole, the ties 
between theory and data proved strong enough to make possible an analysis without altering 
the theoretical framework considerably. I did however cut parts of the theory that proved to 
have very little relevance to the data once the latter had been coded to reflect the aspects of 
the research problem. The themes were drawn from the topics that emerged from the 
interview guide and from the actual interviews. None of the themes were created to directly 
emulate the subchapters of the theoretical framework. The themes for the interviews 
differentiated between those conducted with company respondent and the one conducted with 
the SIVA respondent. In addition to perceptions of culture and practical everyday 
management, the latter focused on; the overall internationalisation strategy and how IHRM is 
related to this; the differences between needs of bigger companies and needs of SMEs, and; 
SIVAs role in helping companies overcome cultural distance and how their role can become 
more active. The last subchapter of the analysis thus draws mostly on findings from the SIVA 
respondent interview. In general, the themes of the analysis were created to emulate the 
different parts of the research questions. Therefore, the IHRM strategies are first established, 
followed by how cultural distance impacts on these, and last, the question of how the 
internationalisation support organisation can help is answered. 
2.6 Research quality 
2.6.1 Credibility and confirmability 
Credibility and confirmability deal with how trustworthy findings are, i.e. to which degree the 
researcher seeks to be objective (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 43). I have previously explained 
how my personal values and previous experiences might have affected the research process. 
Being part of one of the cultures and not the other, I might be culturally biased. On the other 
hand, so might everyone by this rule, and I am familiar with and interested in both of the 
cultures I chose. Thus, I don’t have any interest in coming to any particular conclusions 
regarding negative or possible impacts of specific cultural values on management. The 
research ethic I followed is to let the results inform the conclusions. I also used the method of 
respondent validation of the material.  
Gummesson explains how what he calls the scientific and the consultant paradigms influence 
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why and how research is conducted (ibid, p. 19), generating basic and applied research 
respectively. Business and management research is heavily dependent on companies that are 
willing to share their time, experiences and opinions and to give access to respondents. 
According to Gummesson, management research is often claimed to be too concerned with 
practical applicability, and lacking integrity because of its dependence on business executives. 
This makes it short-sighted and not relevant to general interest (ibid, p. 28) and calls for the 
researcher to continuously reflect on how this affects her research integrity. A researcher who 
takes on the consultant paradigm has to make sure she can steer clear of pressure from the 
“clients” and let ideals of scientific integrity guide her. Conversely, a business researcher who 
acts within the science paradigm needs to keep up with the everyday reality of businesses to 
ensure her research will have any value outside the academic world. Due to a lack of access to 
business life, the latter risks missing topics that have been current for long (ibid, p. 29).  
Like I mentioned earlier, I chose to carry both ambitions. A practical implication of wanting 
the research to be as practically applicable as possible is that I let the case shape the research 
question as well as vice versa.  However, I was not asked to cover any specific topics, hide 
information, or angle the study in any particular way. SIVA’s reason for inviting me was that 
my study would spread knowledge on Scandinavian-Russian business exchange. Thus, the 
high level of involvement with the case only had positive effects, such as coming closer to the 
everyday reality of SIVA and the companies, providing more informal contacts and 
conversations that have informed the process, and giving a clearer connection between the 
research problem and business life. In conclusion, my research integrity was not compromised 
and the findings are arguably credible and confirmable. 
2.6.2 Transparency 
Choosing location as the first sampling parameter did have negative consequences on the 
transparency of data. For example, as the number of Scandinavian companies in Murmansk is 
so small, the identities of companies would easily be uncovered if the industries they work in 
had been stated. In the same way, the views and statements of the individual respondents had 
to be cross-reported as their identities had otherwise been too easy to unravel. The 
consequence of the latter is that readers can’t analyse how for example nationality, position 
and international experience of the individual influences views and statements. If the location 
(other than Russia) had not been chosen as a sampling parameter, a more homogeneous 
sample could have been made, as there are more companies to choose from. Thus, securing 
anonymity would not have had any particular impact on the transparency of data. In addition 
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to this, deciding to sample only companies in Murmansk - as opposed to bigger cities where 
International competition is higher - might mean that findings are not typical of IHRM 
strategies for Scandinavian companies entering Russia. 
The exception to this rule is SIVA and its vice president, who have been presented by name.  
The first reason for this is that there would be pointless to seek to code SIVA as no remotely 
similar organisation exists in Murmansk. The company has to be presented in order to 
understand how a governmental business support organisation can be connected to the 
internationalisation process. Also, the questions asked to the vice president of SIVA do not 
inherit any risk of revealing sensitive information regarding  
 
2.6.3 Transferability and dependability 
Transferability and dependability deal with the generalisability of the findings (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). The most problematic area of this study is arguably the sampling of location, 
companies and respondents. The effect of the chosen sampling approach is that while findings 
can of course be discussed in relation to the theoretical framework, seemingly emergent 
patterns lack solid empirical backing. Considering that the empirical data for this study 
consists solely of five respondents’ answers to my questions, I can’t claim them to be 
generally applicable. Also, the heterogeneity of the sampled companies and respondents 
makes it unwise to compare their answers to each other and make any conclusions about 
transferability. However, the findings do apply to other context than the sampled one, as the 
results comprise a number of attitudes that are likely to emerge in any cross-cultural setting. 
The study is not replicable since the results would have been different if five other 
respondents had been chosen. However, findings would not necessarily have been more 
representative if a bigger number of respondents had been included as the heterogeneity of the 
sample is considerable. Choosing a homogenous sample was problematic. There were 
multiple parameters to take into consideration, e.g; foreign market entry mode, size and 
degree of internationalisation of the companies; nationality, job position, and international 
experience of the respondents. In addition to this, sampling was affected by a lack of access, 
mostly due to practical issues such as time and location. All in all, it was not realistic to find 
enough respondents that fit high demands of homogeneity on all these parameters.  
If only companies that have an HR function had been included, there would have been 
possible to study IHRM policies and practices more closely. Due to the fact that some of the 
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companies didn’t have an HR function, this was not possible. Similarly, if only respondents in 
management or HR department positions had been sampled, greater access to knowledge of 
the companies’ IHRM strategies would likely have been given. Also, choosing only 
Scandinavian – alternatively only Russian – respondents would provide a clearer picture of 
the attitudes one group of nationals has to another. However, recruiting is part of an IHRM 
strategy, and companies recruit both PCNs and HCNs. In conclusion, the sampling approach 
did have a negative effect on the generalisability of the data. However, A homogeneous 
sample of companies would not demonstrate the variety of Scandinavian business in 
Murmansk, thus covering fewer angles of the research problem. The aim of this qualitative 






3. Theoretical framework 
The theories, models and previous studies that form the theoretical framework for this thesis 
have been divided into two main themes: ‘National cultures and management’ (4.1-4.4) and 
‘Strategic international human resource management’ (4.5-4.6). The first part comprises two 
theoretical frameworks that divide views on culture and management: convergence and 
divergence theory respectively. Following this, there will be a literature review of Russian 
management, connected to brief summaries of important historical phases and happenings that 
are believed to have shaped the ‘national character’. This will provide a solid framework for 
understanding how culture can impact on SIHRM, the subject of the second part. In this part, 
SIHRM will be explored by presenting models that cover a number of angles in addition to 
culture. Due to the domination of an MNC perspective in this research field, there will be a 
subchapter relating to SMEs specifically, followed by the ending subject of governmental 
support for SME internationalisation. The whole theoretical framework will be summarised 
and briefly discussed in chapter 3.7. 
29 
 
3.1 National cultures and management: convergence theory 
Convergence theory is based on the assumption that global interaction leads to a gradual 
isomorphism of culture, implying that internationalising companies can spend less time on 
cross-cultural training as cultures are moving closer to one another anyway. According to 
Pugh and Hickson, the subject of organisational convergence focuses on “how far 
organizations in different countries have travelled and may travel in the future along a path of 
global convergence in operations and management, and how far the influence in this of 
specific cultural factors much be understood and planned for if the manager is to be effective 
in cross-cultural situations.” (Pugh and Hickson in Warner and Joynt , 2002, p. 7). The task of 
managers in international companies is then to discover to which degree it is rational to try to 
implement best practice solutions throughout the whole company. Companies and managers 
who take the convergence approach to culture do not deny that there are national differences, 
but rather ask themselves to which degree they are important enough to demand unique 
structuring of the organisation in each country (ibid.) 
According to Pugh and Hickson, a key historical influence on convergence is 
industrialisation. The authors argue that technology “speaks a universal language”, as it is 
more or less the same everywhere and there is global infrastructure for distribution. The 
“logic of industrialism” ensures that companies all over the world will want to aspire to the 
demands of efficiency that the more technologically developed nations set. This creates 
specific industrial structures and a division of labour where key competencies are valued 
higher than “all-roundness” (ibid., pp. 8-9). Pugh and Hickson distinguish three levels of 
convergence:  
Societal convergence: the similarities between cultures are gradually outgrowing their 
differences. The technical revolution has made available information of other parts of the 
world, even to countries with strict censorship regimes. This leads to global convergence and 
shapes individuals’ ideas of what they can achieve in life 
Economic convergence: all nations strive for, and eventually choose the type of economy 
that generates the most growth. Presently, this is the market economy. An example of this 
supposed superiority is how the Soviet and Eastern European plan economies collapsed and 
instituted market economy instead 
Management convergence: as a logical next step to economic convergence, organisations all 
over the world need to work in a similar way to live up to measures of efficiency, growth and 
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technological development that will secure a better position in the global market. This in turn 
makes management procedures converge globally (ibid.). 
The authors also note that management practices that become global benchmarks do not 
always come from the more technologically developed nations, and give the example of the 
Japanese focus on workforce training at the time when the country was still at an early phase 
of industrialisation. This best practice concept became an essential part of the TQM (total 
quality management) philosophy, which goes to show that management innovations that 
reflect one specific culture can become incorporated into the global management convergence 
and, with time, adopted even by cultures that are less receptive (ibid.). 
 In conclusion, the convergence approach views all societal layers as subjects of free market 
competition ruled by a strive for efficiency and growth. The types of society, economy and 
management that can provide this will gradually be adopted by cultures all over the world. 
The convergence processes are thus seen as dialectic by nature, as each cultural entity 
(person, company, society) chooses what to adopt, and can also “export” philosophies and 
practices to the collection of best practices on free market terms.  Cultural convergence is thus 
not a one-way process, but is usually lead by one or a couple of dominating cultures. 
3.2. National cultures and management: divergence theory 
Divergence theorists do not showcase this belief in universal best practice panaceas. Instead, 
they place great importance on cultural differences and the learning that this can give 
international companies. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars criticise the convergence 
approach by claiming that even experienced MNCs often fail when trying to implement 
seemingly universal best practices due to (sometimes tacit) cultural differences (1997, p. 2). 
Taras et al. claim that cultural values are stronger predictors of work outcomes than for 
example education level, race, gender or age, and argue that tests of cultural values in the 
recruitment process gives better indications of attitudes and behaviour than personality tests 
(2009). The researchers and studies presented below are arguably the most noted in the field. 
These mostly used quantitative methods with a great number of participants, and the most 
cited studies are longitudinal or part of bigger research projects.  
3.2.1 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions  
Practically all research on culture’s effect on management since the early 1980’s cites 
Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions (1980). Geert Hofstede is a trained psychologist who 
worked with HRM at IBM and surveyed IBM employees on all organisational levels in over 
31 
 
40 countries on their values. The IBM data was collected at two points in the 1960’ and 70’s. 
The four, later five, dimensions are  
1.Power distance: The views on inequality and hierarchy in a society. A high score denotes a 
high level of inequality and hierarchical structures. 
2.Uncertainty avoidance:  how a society deals with the unknown. Cultures with high 
uncertainty avoidance respond with fear, while low uncertainty avoidance instead signifies 
curiosity. 
3.Individualism/collectivism: if a society is dominated by “everybody for her- or himself” 
logic or by the idea that people should “remain attached to tight groups throughout life”. 
4.Masculinity/femininity: whether a society views the sexes as more alike than unlike, or if 
it assumes that women and men must have clearly separated roles in life. Femininity signifies 
that roles overlap, leading to a ‘tender’ society, while masculinity signifies strict gender roles, 
leading to a ‘tough’ society. 
 5.Long-term orientation: explains a culture’s perspective on time. Short-term oriented 
cultures foster a need for instant gratification and an inability to consider long-term 
implications, while long-term orientation cultures has a broad time horizon, and cherish 
values like thrift and persuasion (Hofstede in Warner and Joynt, 2002) 
The key findings of Hofstede’s studies were that the national cultures of the participants 
fostered different beliefs, attitudes and behaviours even though they were all employed in the 
same company. Thus, Hofstede’s research supports divergence theory. Although hugely cited, 
Hofstedes model has also received criticism, broadly summarised by Warner and Braun 
(2002) as: ignorance of variations on a regional, subcultural or individual level; a “culturalist” 
perspective which inherently carries cultural bias and a risk of racism; and methodological 
weakness in that the study was only conducted in one corporation, thus not considering the 
part played by organisational culture (Braun and Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002, p. 15). It 
might be useful to remember that Hofstede’s studies were ground-breaking at the time, and 
that pioneering work tends to get overtaken eventually by the research it inspires. However, 
Hofstede can be credited with drawing the map for cultural management studies and 
continues to influence research within the field, such as the GLOBE project.  
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3.2.3 The GLOBE project 
Another frequently cited work is the longitudinal GLOBE ("Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness") research project, which was initiated in 1991 by 
Professor Robert J. House at the University of Pennsylvania, and is the most extensive cross-
cultural management research project to date (Ambrozheichik, 2011, p. 312). It was 
conducted by 48 researchers, making the risk of cultural bias lower. The sample in the first 
study, published in 2004, contained almost 18000 middle managers from approximately 825 
organisations in 62 countries (ibid.) 
The purpose of the project was to study which leadership traits that were embraced 
throughout different societies, as this was assumed to be highly symptomatic of cultural 
affiliation. The survey was based on 21 leadership styles that were subdivided and ranked on 
their degree of ‘universality’, i.e. how globally embraced they proved to be. The sampled 
countries were later placed in 10 cluster based on similarities in how they responded. The 
project also found 9 cultural dimensions (ibid.). All leadership traits were measured by the 
two parameters ‘as is’ (practices) and ‘should be’ (values). One new dimension from the 
previously is the humane orientation (whether altruism is rewarded). The objective 
accomplished by the GLOBE project is a more specific model of cultural values as shown 
through its view of leadership ideals.  
In conclusion, there is a variety of dimensions on which to measure cultural values as well as 
leadership ideals. Taras et al. (2009) claim that “cultural values are a better predictor of 
employee outcomes for older, more educated, male, and working people” since cultural values 
are supposedly more firmly set in these (p.193). Even though the studies employ quantitative 
methods, the dimensions are useful as parameters for analysis of qualitative data as well. 
However, the literature often has a focus on managers, with the result that gender, class and 
subcultural variables are not thoroughly explored. Also, the fact that the cultural dimensional 
values are normally presented in the form of national means might make this a less reliable 
research method when exploring countries that have experienced considerable societal 
changes, as there may be great divides between politically informed ‘sets’ of cultural values. 
This is evident in cultural values research on Russia, a country that has gone from 




3.3 Literature review: Russian national values and management 
styles 
As Ambrozheichik states (2011), research on Russian management has mostly described 
behaviour in practice rather than developed prescriptive theories. There has been suggestions 
crystallising a Russian cultural identity is difficult, and that the country itself is in the process 
of “shaking off” the Soviet identity that is by some believed to have overshadowed a true 
Russian identity, and still does so to a degree (Gilbert, 2001). The author concludes that “the 
idea of a ‘Russian’ culture, however, which can be defined, measured, and packaged into 
convenient dimensions, resists capture.” (ibid., p.19). The blurred lines between ‘Soviet’ and 
‘Russian’ traits makes it particularly difficult to “pin down” Russian culture by measuring 
national means. This has the impact that foreign companies should not uncritically consult 
cultural values research of Russians when planning to enter the Russian market, and that they 
instead have to pay special attention to ‘layers’ in the culture. This arguably demands cross-
cultural competences beyond the 
The most high-profile research on Russian Management stems from the 90’s when the 
Russian economy was experiencing rapid changes, and Russian companies sought to 
incorporate Western leadership concepts in their organisations. May et al. noted in their 
article of the first decade of Russian market freedom: “Throughout the 1990s, the 
transformation of Russian management practices to free market standards has been at the 
forefront of international issues.” (1998). In this transitional era, the research focused mainly 
on how to implement Western management and HRM practices in Russia. Since the transition 
to market economy was not gradual, the Russian lack of know-how on non-Soviet business 
methods was very much an urgent problem that threatened societal order. However, Elenkov 
(1998) found that American management concepts, mistakenly thought of as Universalist, that 
do not reflect Russian national values will result in failure. The researcher nonetheless noted 
that the effect of convergence makes transfer of certain management traits possible.  
There are some indications that result-based management is becoming popular in Russia. As 
Ambrozheichik notes of a study of Russian managers: “The most preferred style identified by 
Fey et al. (2001), task-oriented democrat, is consistent with the high score given in the 
GLOBE study to Performance Orientation (one of the Charismatic leadership components) 
and low scores given to Humane Leadership.” (2001, p. 316). However, GLOBE scores on 
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this point were low on the ‘As is’ parameter (Gratchev et al., 2002), which shows that 
performance-based management is yet to be widely adopted in the country. It is also worth 
noting that the Fey et al. study was conducted among managers who were undergoing 
business education in English, many of whom working for foreign companies. These 
managers also scored high on participation, i.e. wanting to involve other organisational levels 
in decision processes (Ambrozheichik, 2011). 
Many studies on Russian Management have used Hofstede’s model or alterations of it (e.g. 
Elenkov, 1998; Naumov, 1996; Bollinger, 1994). Some of these have employed country-
clustering by practices and values as a means of mapping cultural distance. In the GLOBE 
project, Russia was put in the ‘Eastern-European’ cluster. There was no sample from Norway, 
but the other Nordic countries in the sample were put in the same cluster (‘Nordic’). These 
two clusters were found to be direct opposites (CCL.org, 2012). The most globally embraced 
leadership style was ‘charismatic/value based’ style (ibid.) which was thought of as the ideal 
management style in Russia also, while the least popular was the ‘self-protecting’ style 
(Gratchev, 2002). This was also the case for the Nordic countries (Gratchev, 2002). However, 
one difference is that the spread between the lowest and highest score is wider in the Nordic 
cluster (more than 3 points out of 7 at most for the Nordic while only about 2 for Russia). 
This suggests stronger views on what ‘bad’ and ‘good’ leadership is in the Nordic countries, 
or possibly a higher level of consensus. However, the data from the Russian sample was 
collected in 1995-96 (Ambrozheichik, 2011, p. 313), i.e. only about 5 years after the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union, possibly making it unrepresentative of current views.  





Source: Hofstede centre, 2013 
 
Power distance: Russia has a long history of powerful elites and autocratic rulers (e.g. the 
tsars, the Orthodox Church, the land-owning class, and the Communist party elite). The 
country only experienced about half a century of ‘freedom’ between the end of serfdom in 
1861 and the October revolution in 1917.  This can help in explaining the high score on this 
dimension. Gilbert (2001) challenges researchers who claim that the Soviet era conversely has 
fostered a belief in equality (i.e. low PDI) by stating that this is confused with equity (in the 
distribution of resources). The author raises a central question about the PDI measurement: 
“To what extent is an apparent preference for an autocratic boss a reflection of communist 
traditions, a legacy that is now being shaken off? Issues arise about the validity of the Power 
Distance concept for former communist countries.” (ibid., p.7). The implications of this is that 
while there are political shifts in all countries that lead to a certain degree of cultural change 
between generations, cultural dimensions measuring of countries that have gone through all-
encompassing system transitions have to be updated frequently since certain traits might fade 
off as time progresses. Naumov (1996) found that Russia has medium power distance, and 
that it leans towards paternalism, i.e. the leader as a caregiving father-figure idea is gaining 
more popularity than the leader as an authoritative boss (Ambrozheichik, 2011). Gilbert 
(2001) found that personal power was more important than role power in Russian companies, 
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broadly corresponding to the ‘Achievement vs. ascription’ dimension of Trompenaars, and to 
the ‘Political influence’ dimension of Elenkov.  
Individualism vs. Collectivism: Russia is noted as a Collectivist country (e.g. Hofstede, 
1982; Naumov, 1996). Gilbert (2001) suggests that the exact meaning of the word ‘ team’ is 
difficult to define, and that it can be associated with joining together to perform a certain task 
as in team-work, while it can also denote a more profound sense of collective needs being 
sacred and individual needs selfish. This suggests that the dimension is too vague and thus not 
valid. Gratchev et al. similarily argue that while Russia is often ‘stereotyped’ as strongly 
collectivist, it only scrapes the surface of a much more complicated structure of practices and 
values. Collectivism has historically been prescribed by institutions rather than a result of 
people’s values, even if these are partly collectivist. Times of war, economic turbulence and 
general uncertainty has also made it necessary for people to come together and support each 
other. Gratchev et al. note that it might be the crisis era of the Soviet breakdown that allowed 
Western influences of entrepreneurship and individualism that have created the conflicted 
current situation of collectivism on one hand, and roofless individualism on the other 
Russians value macro-level collectivism (society basis) lower than micro-level collectivism 
(family)  judging by the ‘as is’ parameters (Gratchev et al., 2002). 
Masculinity vs. femininity: Russia is often noted as being more on the ‘feminine’ side (e.g. 
Hofstede, n.d.;), i.e. that it is driven by ‘soft’ vales such as consensus and care for others 
rather than ‘hard’ values such as competitiveness. Naumov explains the low level of 
competitive orientation in Russian managers as a result of Soviet era repression of 
individualism and entrepreneurial values (1998). However, the score of 55 on this dimension 
in Naumov’s study (Ambrozheichik, 2011) was higher than Hofstede’s score of 36, making 
Russia a medium ‘masculine’ country. Gilbert (2001) noted that display of emotional 
behaviour in Russian workplaces is not seen as weakness or inability or irrationality as in 
Western countries. When gender equality was measured in the GLOBE project, it was neither 
seen as very important (i.e. not in line with the general trend in other GLOBE countries), nor 
unwelcomed. Grachev et al. further explain how Soviet “caring-for-people” indoctrination 
was instrumental in evening out gender roles, at least by means of equal opportunities. 
However, historical issues such as imperialism, strong admiration for the military, all-
powerful leaders, frequent participation in wars, and economic turbulence of late have created 
an appreciation for the assertive male character (Gratchev et al., 2002). Hofstede argues that 
“Russia’s relatively low score of 36 may surprise with regard to its preference for status 
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symbols, but these are in Russia related to the high Power Distance (…)Dominant behaviour 
might be accepted when it comes from the boss, but is not appreciated among peers.” (Geert-
Hofstede.com, n.d.)  
Uncertainty avoidance: Russia is a country that reacts to the unknown with fear rather than 
curiosity (Hofstede, 1982; Bollinger, 1994; Naumov, 1996; Elenkov, 1998). Hofstede 
measured extremely high UA in Russians, with a score of 93. The other studies got lower 
scores, but still high above medium. Naumov (1998) suggests that the high score marks low 
levels of participatory urge in employees and scepticism of changes in leadership 
(Ambrozheichik, 2011). In the GLOBE project, the most surprising result was that Russia had 
the lowest score of all on the ‘As is’ uncertainty avoidance parameter. This is suggested to 
show “uncertainty acceptance in the transitional economy” in contrast to the high score 
‘should be’ parameter that confirms the more typical Russian scores, i.e. an inclination to 
wish for stability (Grachev et al., 2002, p. 15). This can be explained by the following 
interpretation to Russian UA: “Stephan and Abalakina-Paap (1996) assert that Russians are 
less concerned than Americans with uncertainty avoidance ‘because they have had to live 
with uncertainty for so long’ (Gilbert, 2001, p. 7). However, Gilbert also notes that Russian 
UA is present whether it is liked or not, evidenced by high levels of alcoholism and suicide, 
coupled with a drop in public health (ibid., p.16). A long history of authoritarian ruling, 
bloody power shifts, and Soviet era high level of control of practically all aspects of people’s 
lives has shaped Russian scepticism of the unknown. Puffer suggests that a streak for lack of 
initiative and fear of responsibility was apparent even in medieval times, when village (‘mir’) 
members would not act until they received an order from the chief leader, as his wishes could 
not be anticipated (Puffer, 1994). Russia also has a long history of being under attack (e.g. the 
Mongolian invasion of the then called Kievan Rus’ in 1223), participating in wars, and of 
course being virtually closed from the non-Communist world throughout the Soviet era.  
 
Other dimensions: In addition to Hofstede’s four original values (scoring similar results), 
Elenkov measured political-influence orientation (the use of informal influence and personal 
contacts to exercise power) and Dogmatism (openness to new ideas from others). Findings 
were that Russian managers demonstrated a very strong propensity for exercising their power 
in an intuitive way rather than legitimising actions by referring to facts and figures. They 
scored lower than their American counterparts on dogmatism which suggests that they’re 
more open to ideas (1998). As this dimension hasn’t been used in other noted studies it is 
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difficult to judge the impact of this. The high power distance makes it an unlikely feature, 
however it can be argued that it is in line with a Collectivist attitude.  
In conclusion, this first part of the theoretical framework shows that there are two opposite 
views on how companies should regard culture when internationalising; convergence and 
divergence theory. The first assumes that the importance of national cultures is fading off 
from the effects of globalisation. The latter disregards this idea, and is evident in research that 
seeks to measure national cultures by researching shared values. This research carries the risk 
of ignoring gender, race-, age-, class-related, sub-cultural and individual differences for the 
sake of emphasising national differences. This risk is manifest in cultural values research on 
Russia, as ‘national’ cultural values are marked by a clear division of Socialist values and 
‘modern Russian’ values. The latter are difficult to pin-point, as it’s impossible to tell whether 
they are inherent in pre-Socialist Russian culture, influences from Western cultures, or a 
mixture of many factors. However, it has also been established that in cultural values 
research, Scandinavian countries and Russia are opposites, which arguably has some degree 
of significance. Together, this suggests that Scandinavian companies are not wise to disregard 
the effects of national culture when establishing themselves in Russia. Neither should they 
make the mistake of painting a Russian stereotype from the results of cultural values research. 
This variety of theories and evidence complicates, but arguably necessitates, the shaping of 
human resource strategies for Scandinavian companies with interest in Russia. 
3.4 Strategic International Human Resource Management (SIHRM) 
 
The connection between HRM and overall international business strategy has received 
increased recognition. Many studies imply that the greatest management challenge for MNCs 
is to incorporate IHRM with global strategy while simultaneously following local labour laws 
and cultural codes (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1988; Schuler et al. 2002). As stated by Braun 
and Warner, HRM is arguably the management function that is most heavily affected by 
culture. It is also the one that is most heavily regulated by local labour regulation laws (Braun 
and Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002). Not even the basic concept of HRM is culturally 
neutral. The economist notion of employees as human resources is by some said to be an 
essentially American concept that is tied to the idea of the ‘American dream’ in its 
assumptions that human beings have unlimited potential that can be realised if this ‘resource’ 
is managed the right way (ibid., p. 17). Ma and Allen call for consideration of cultural values 
of employees in global recruitment (2009) while Taras et. al (2009) argue that when 
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connecting cultural values to job performance, the nature of the job – e.g. whether an 
individualist or collectivist mindset is needed - must be considered (p. 193) and go on to 
claim that lessons from three decades of research on the effects of national cultures on 
management show that job designs, hierarchical structure and HR practices should reflect 
national culture, and suggest that even minor adjustments of this are likely to lead to 10-20 % 
performance improvement (2011). Moor and Shoobridge (2011) found evidence that a multi-
ethnic workforce increases the likeliness of internationalisation, and also makes the process more 
successful. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1988) noted that Japanese and Western responses to the globalised 
environment were quite different. European and American MNCs, whose subsidiaries were 
normally granted relative autonomy and were therefore flexible to changes in the local 
market, focused on improving control and coordination of their worldwide activities. The 
Japanese on the other hand, having strongly centralised strategies, had instead began to deal 
with the demand for local adaption. Again, simultaneous mastering of global integration and 
local adaption seems to be the make-or-break-it point when developing IHRM strategies, as 
suggested by the two following frameworks. 
3.4.1 The Shuler et al. SIHRM framework 
Schuler et al. (1993) developed one of the earlier popular frameworks for SIHRM. The 
company’s ability to balance local responsiveness and global efficiency/organisational 
integration in the IHRM processes determines the outcomes of its international goals. Schuler 
et al. regard SIHRM as a key component in achieving these goals. Their framework contains 
internal as well as external factors that have an impact on IHRM policies and practices (e.g. 
planning, staffing, appraising, compensating, training and developing and labour relations). 
The external factors regard industry characteristics as well as national/regional culture and 
other characteristics, while the internal factors are the company’s business strategy, the 
structure of their international operations, and the ‘international orientation’ of HQ, i.e. 
whether central management wants power to be centrally or locally placed, or if they seek  
globally converged (Schuler et al. 2002).  
3.4.2 The Adler and Ghadar SIHRM phases framework 
Another model for understanding SIHRM is Adler and Ghadar (1989) which connects 
different IHRM strategies to phases in the internationalisation process. For each of the phases, 
which correspond to the product life cycle, there is an appropriate or logical HR response. 




The high tech phase: The company focuses on product orientation, and turn to a niche 
segment in the domestic market. The company poses a rather arrogant attitude to foreign 
markets, exporting the product but not altering it for foreign markets. HR response: No 
particular IHRM efforts are needed at this phase, as the company primarily offers its product 
to the home market. The need for competence in international management is practically non-
existent. No language or cultural training is needed. 
 
2. Internationalisation and growth: The company faces competition and needs to expand its 
market. Focus moves from product to process engineering. Production is moved to the foreign 
markets as demand increases. Focus is put on differentiation. HR response: As focus shifts to 
the needs of specific foreign market, the need for cultural adaption increases. The company 
often sends HQ managers to supervise, market products et cetera. Language skills and cultural 
sensitivity is valued in managers. Innovation and development takes place in the home 
country, and HCN career development is limited to country managing director posts. 
 
3. The maturity phase: Markets are saturated and no further product development is possible 
due to heavy competition and wide availability of product technology. Competitive advantage 
can only be reached through cost-price reductions, which are made by moving more 
production to low-cost countries, from which the (high-cost) domestic market subsequently 
will get supplied. HR response: Cultural sensitivity again decreases as the product has 
reached mass-production and is practically undifferentiated. Focus on standardisation and 
centralisation. The MNC strives to achieve a network of global managers. However, cross-
cultural skills and language training are not prioritised, as the objective is cultural 
convergence throughout the global organisation. Organisational culture is assumed to prevail 
over differences in national culture. 
 
The trans-global phase: Due to the acceleration of the product life cycle in modern times, 
the companies that wish to be globally competitive need to simultaneously go through these 
phases. This type of company “is born” with the challenge of being more locally adapted as 
well as reaching a higher degree of organisational integration and coordination of processes.  
Products and marketing is developed for specific markets, all conducted within a highly 
sophisticated global strategy. HR response: Cultural sensitivity is deemed crucial for success, 
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and cultural diversity cannot be ignored for these ‘born globals’, IHRM is thus closely related 
to strategy (Adler and Ghadar, 1989). 
 
The scope of the model is that it can help companies make strategic IHRM decisions for each 
phase, or, if they’re ‘born globals’ create an IHRM strategy in line with the overall global 
strategy. Whilst this has given the model recognition, it has also been criticised for being out-
dated, as some argue that practically all companies are ‘born globals’ in modern days. 
Another point of criticism is that it fails to recognise that the product life cycle differs from 
case to case and that most companies have a differentiated product line, thus making the 
model prescriptive rather than descriptive (Braun and Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002). 
  
Whilst the Schuler et al. model provides a broad but rather unspecific framework, the Adler 
and Ghader model claim that (I)HRM strategies develop along the steps in the product life-
cycle, rather than recognising the companies’ cross-cultural competences and international 
orientation as central to their internationalisation choices. As will be shown in the following 
subchapter, foreign market entry mode is viewed as another determinant. Depending on the 
need for global efficiency and/or local adaption, the chosen foreign market entry mode can 
either ease or aggravate the shaping of the IHRM strategy.  
3.5 Foreign market entry mode and power relations 
 
Foreign market entry mode is the term that describes the specific form under which a 
company goes through the internationalisation process. These are subdivided into equity-
based and non-equity based (cooperation between separate legal entities) modes. Examples of 
the former include international joint ventures (IJVs), mergers and wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOSs). The latter can be subdivided into greenfield investment and acquisitions. The entry 
mode and the power relations affect the company’s degree of control over the new venture. 
According to Dowling et al., typical of IHRM in both mergers and IJVs is that decisions need 
to balance the interests of two or more groups with different cultural, institutional and 
organisational backgrounds. In addition, IHRM in IJV’s faces an additional challenge in 
having to simultaneously find appropriate strategies and policies for the IJV while also 
justifying these to the parent companies and take their interests into consideration. 
Furthermore, the parts forming a IJV have to be well compatible and form a united front to 
own the trust of the parent companies. HR is then highly connected to strategy by forming 
and implementing policies that foster cross-cultural learning, as learning outcomes depend on 
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the people of the organisation (Dowling et al., 2007, pp. 59-61). Thus, IJVs and mergers can 
alleviate the shaping of locally responsible HRM strategies, as the local partner brings the 
cultural competence needed for this. However, these entry modes can prevent cross-cultural 
learning if the host country partner single-handedly is responsible for managing human and 
the partners prove to be incompatible. 
 
 More than a decade before Adler and Ghadar’s model, Johansson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
developed a similar model of gradual internationalisation called the Uppsala model. In this 
model, foreign market entry mode is connected depends on the degree of cultural distance 
(e.g. different language, culture, political system, level of education and industrialisation) thus 
companies begin their internationalisation in psychologically (and often geopraphically) close 
countries where market conditions are similar and less efforts need to be made. They usually 
start with exports, go on to set up sales subsidiaries and finally put up production in the new 
market. The company gradually gains knowledge and resources for further 
internationalisation into more psychologically distant markets (Johansson and Wiedershelm-
Paul, 1975). Drawing on the Uppsala model, Kogut and Singh (1988) found evidence for the 
relationship between cultural distance and foreign market entry mode. They also described the 
Uppsala model as an example of uncertainty avoidance of companies. Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions were used to measure the two parameters. Findings were that if cultural distance 
is considerable, a company will often choose IJVs as entry mode. The more multinational a 
company is, the more likely it will choose acquisitions. The same criticism as that of Adler 
and Ghadar’s model is of course applicable to the Uppsala model, i.e. being out-dated and not 
considering born globals. 
3.5.1 Heenan and Pearlmutter’s three international orientations 
Heenan and Pearlmutter (1974) argues that the level of foreign venture unit autonomy is 
dependent on the cultural sensitivity of the top management, or on their “international 
orientation”; ethnocentric: subsidiary autonomy is highly limited, strategic decisions are 
made at HQ, and top positions in subsidiaries are held by PCNs; polycentric: this approach is 
more dialectic. Each subsidiary is treated as a unique entity which enjoys some influence over 
local strategy, often managed by HCNs who however rarely get promoted to HQ positions; 
geocentric: the MNC “recruits globally” and does not regard nationality when recruiting and 
promoting, instead the ability of the employee to act in line with the globally integrated 




According to this model, it is the values and cultural understanding of HQ top management 
that determines whether the subsidiary manager will be able to make balanced management 
decisions based on the local environment in addition to centralised company procedures. The 
orientations are also broadly parallel to Adler and Ghadar’s internationalisation phases. The 
implications of the ethnocentric orientation for SIHRM is that the MNC will meet 
considerable challenges in adapting HRM policies to the local environment as HCN managers 
are not recruited, and adaptability thus depends largely on the PCN’s cultural sensitivity. 
According to Taylor et al., this approach goes hand in hand with an exportative SIHRM 
orientation where all HRM policies from HQ are passed on to the subsidiary, and focus lies 
on system integration. The authors connect the geocentric approach to an integrative SIHRM 
orientation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), but argue that the latter gives room for a higher 
degree of two-way bench-marking between HQ and subsidiary (1996). Heenan and 
Pearlmutter’s model has been criticised for not specifying factors that influence the different 
orientations or considering other reasons (e.g. company size, industry structure) that affect 
subsidiary  autonomy (Braun and Warner in Warner and Joynt, 2002).  
3.5.2 Control and coordination 
Control and coordination within MNCs has been the focus of many articles (e.g. Jaeger and 
Baliga: 1984; Doz and Pralahad, 1984; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Hamilton and 
Kashlak, 1999). In the 1990’s - a time when globalisation accelerated through new technology 
- publications on the theme were numerous. Hamilton and Kashlak (1999) view IHRM as an 
important tool for controlling subsidiaries, especially in culturally distant nations with high 
political and economic risks for the MNC. Bonache and Fernandez also view cultural distance 
as a parameter that determines whether it’s best to hire a PCN or HCN manager. When 
cultural distance is high and the level of trust is low, the costs and efforts for selection, 
training and controlling HCNs will be considerable. In such a case, it’s deemed safer to send a 
PCN manager who can create a culture where HCNs can eventually be trusted and awarded 
higher positions (Bonache and Fernandez in Scullion and Linehan, 2005, p. 122). According 
to Boyacigiller (1990), a standardisation of processes is not an ideal way to control affiliates 
in multinationals comprising a variety of institutional environments and activities. However, 
the risk of the affiliate as perceived by the parent company determines the need for control 
and coordination of it. Boyacigiller views deep socialisation of employees as the alternative to 
formal control systems, but raises concern that this is time consuming and demands expertise.  
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3.5.3 Expatriate management 
An alternative is for HQ to send parent company nationals to manage the foreign venture. 
This is called expatriation, the traditional international management strategy. This approach 
emphasises control and mainly fosters one-way knowledge transfer. However, according to 
Schuler et al. (2002), reasons for sending PCNs can be to train local talent, and to spread the 
expatriate’s acquired knowledge throughout the organisation at the point of repatriation 
(ibid.). It has been suggested that expatriation in many cases leads to costly failures due to 
cultural mismatches and adaption difficulties (Bonache and Fernandez in Scullion and 
Linehan, 2005, p. 125). Other potential problems are spousal arrangements, especially dual-
careers support (Schuler et al., 2002) and repatriation, as internationalisation often takes place 
simultaneously with domestic market downsizing, and because there is rarely a post foreign 
assignment career plan (Scullion and Paauwe in Scullion and Lindehan, 2005, p. 37-8). There 
is concern that many MNCs still primarily employ PCNs, and academic support for 
inpatriation (ibid.), which is the process of training and developing HCNs through transfers to 
HQ. The strategy marks a recognition that innovation and knowledge from local managers 
can be beneficial to HQ, and benefits of the strategy are that it fosters a multicultural 
awareness and flexibility throughout the MNC (Scullion and Lindehan, 2005, p. 10). 
3.5.4 SIHRM in small and medium-sized enterprises 
Schuler et al. (2002) suggest that SIHRM research demands a multiple-layer analysis: “the 
external social, political, cultural and economic environment; the industry, the firm, the sub-
unit, the group, and the individual”. However, they note that research on SIHRM is hugely 
focused on MNCs (ibid.). In combination, there is possibly not as much to be learned from the 
bulk of previous SIHRM research for SMEs as one would wish. However, there is growing 
recognition of the need to focus on ‘micromultinationals’, as SME internationalisation is 
becoming more common. Following the definition of the European Union from 2005, an 
SME is – by headcount measures - a company that employs less than 250 people. Studies 
point to previous international experience of managers in SMEs as key to foreign venture 
success, and notes ‘poor human resource management’ as a common reason for failure (Scullion 
and Linehan, 2005, p. 8-9). In an expert report on the subject of SME internationalisation, the 
European Commission noted that both the age of the SME founder and the size of the SME were 
important factors for how likely the SME is to go on a foreign venture. According to the report, 
the smaller the size of the SME, the less likely the internationalisation of it. This is supposedly a 
result of micro firms rarely having clear management and a propensity for making “opportunistic 
rather than systematic strategic decisions” (The European Commission, 2005, p. 12). Generally, 
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the larger a company, the more internationalised (ibid., s.14). If the SME doesn’t have an 
internationalisation strategy at all, but makes strategic decisions in a haphazard and unplanned 
manner, a logical consequence is that it won’t have a IHRM strategy. A follow up “good practices 
selection” report published by the commission noted that the lack of management skills and long-
term availability of human resources is one of the main barriers to internationalisation, even 
though this is not always understood by the SMEs (The European Commission, 2008, p. 17). 
These factors suggest that SMEs need support at the point of internationalisation, something 
which is increasingly offered by governments. 
 
3.6 Governmental support of SME internationalisation 
Schuler et al. (2002) show that while many countries’ economies are dominated by SMEs, they 
meet considerable challenges at the point of internationalisation (e.g. lack of working capital, 
international experience, power to stand up against host country government). Many countries, as 
well as intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union, have strategies for 
supporting SMEs. In a report titled “Supporting the internationalisation of SMEs”, an expert 
group selected by the commission found that 
 
“Despite the advantages of embracing globalisation and the risks of not doing so many European SMEs still 
remain focused on their national markets: only 8% of EU27 SMEs export and only 12% of the inputs of an 
average SME are purchased abroad. The main reported reasons are a lack of financial resources but most of all 
lack of skills or skilled human capital to tackle internationalisation.In order to have more internationalised SMEs 
Government support remains vital. Many SMEs would not consider internationalisation if it were not because of 
support. This “additionality” effect fully justifies governmental intervention. ”  
 
The expert group concluded that internationalisation needs to be part of the long-term strategies of 
European SMEs rather than an ‘exit strategy’ when demand in the domestic market decreases. 
Also, the government should support ‘present SMEs’ on an individual and long-term basis, and 
‘future SMEs’ by focusing on entrepreneurship in education as well as encouraging and providing 
language education for entrepreneurs (The European Commission, 2007, p.4) 
 
The commission states three types of support programmes; (1) Individual support: holistic 
programmes that help companies develop an internationalisation strategy by the means of SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) types of analysis of the individual company (2) 
Financial support: funding of internationalisation projects and/or providing information on where 
to acquire capital (3) Networks: developing or finding support networks or co-ordination networks 
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for the SME (ibid.). Cooperation networks are a means of achieving operational cooperation 
between companies, i.e. a form of strategic alliance. The European Commission’s expert group 
defines a support network as usually managed by the government, for example through 
commercial offices abroad, or by big business associations. Further on, these networks can 
“provide access to information that is directly usable by the SME” and give individual SME 
consultation (The European Commission, 2007, p.24). The commission’s concluding words on 
network design is that: “for classic sectors which tend to internationalise through stages support 
networks are vital. For new fast moving sectors, for “born globals” development networks provide 
better support.” (ibid.) In the commission’s ‘good practice selection’ report from 2008, it was 
noted that SME mentoring of SMEs and coaching programmes can help build more SME skills in 
HRM at the point of internationalisation (The European Commission, 2008, p. 17). In an OECD 
survey from 2008, two of the most important difficulties (ranked as number 6 and 5 out of 10) 
were “obtaining reliable foreign representation” and “lack of managerial time to deal with 
internationalization”. Listed at number 9 was “lack of home government assistance/incentives” 
(Schuler et al., 2002, p. 66). This suggests that SMEs need particular support in IHRM issues in 
addition to for example financial support programmes when internationalising their operations. 
However, HRM does not seem to be a management function which is prioritised – if at all present 
- in internationalisation support programmes. 
3.7. Summary 
The ultimate part of the theoretical framework provides a sample of the various factors that 
shape IHRM strategies, especially in MNCs. These are for example the product-life cycle, the 
foreign market entry mode, and the international orientation of HQ top managers (i.e. how 
they weigh the needs for local adaption against global efficiency). The traditionally common 
strategy of sending an expatriate manager is supposedly a result of strategic decisions; either 
of wanting to control and coordinate the actions of the foreign venture, or to train HCNs to 
manage the local branch. The Uppsala model suggests that companies will start with export - 
which doesn’t require any IHRM strategy at all – and that they’ll avoid culturally distant 
markets at first. This marks the traditional internationalisation pattern, while born global 
companies have to create SIHRM strategies early in their life cycle. Arguably, the plethora of 
different models proves the difficulties in establishing causal relationships between the 
different factors. The lack of SIHRM in SMEs is marked as one of the reasons that they fail to 




Looking at the whole theoretical framework, a pattern of interdependence between culture, 
management and IHRM strategies emerge. Cultural distance cannot be viewed as the single 
determinant to a successful IHRM strategy: a number of both internal and external factors 
have to be weighed in. On the other hand, the existence of the fast-to-internationalise born 
global does not incline that these companies don’t encounter cultural challenges. They are 
arguably simply better at handling them. The lesson that can be learned from the theoretical 
framework is that if a company chooses to internationalise, it will benefit from an IHRM 
strategy. The beginning sentence of this thesis still holds true: the rapid pace of globalisation 
leads to strategic advantages for companies that understand the value of culture. 
4. Findings 
The majority of the data was collected in Murmansk, Russia. The first part of this chapter 
comprises interviews with the 4 company respondents. The results are presented by the 
method of cross-reporting, which means that the respondents’ answers are summarised 
collectively to avoid reaping sensitive information about individual views. The second part 
consists of results from the interview with the vice president of the Norwegian governmental 
business support organisation. The data is thematically coded. 4.1.1 comprise themes that 
collectively map views on cultural values and management, while the themes in 4.1.2 serve to 
illustrate some HRM policies and practices of Scandinavian companies in Murmansk. 
4.1 The Murmansk companies 
Company A is the subsidiary of a major Norwegian company. The Russian partly-owned 
subsidiary employs around 50 people. The parent company’s activity is centred around 
Norway, and is thus not appropriately described as an MNC. In Norway, the company is 
divided into regional independent branches, with the Northern-most one being most closely 
tied to the Russian subsidiary. There is an HR function at both the Russian head office and the 
local branch. They focus mainly on cross-border services but is also directed at Russian 
customers. A minority of the company is owned by a Russian company, from which 60-70 % 
of the staff were transferred when the merger took place. All of the management and staff at 
the Murmansk branch are Russian. Except for the respondent, there has not been any staff 
exchange between the Murmansk branch and any of the Norwegian branches. The parent 
company had a representation office in Murmansk before initiating the present Russian 
venture, and has worked for a long time to get into the Russian market. The parent company 
has an HRM strategy, however no international ditto. When advertising a management 
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position at the Russian head office, the company requested knowledge of Russian as well as 
English and Norwegian, cultural understanding, and the ability to work in multi-cultural 
teams. At the head office, management consists of both Norwegians and Russians. The board 
consists of 2 Russians and 5 Norwegians. The company regularly sends Russian staff on 
training in Norway, but not vice versa. 
 
Company B is a local micro business
3
 with less than 10 employees in total. The company 
works in various fields, but primarily with cross-border services. A majority of the customers 
are Norwegians and other Scandinavians. The language skills needed by every employee 
depends on the customer segments s/-he serves, Russian is not required per se. However, the 
majority of the staff are Russian. The company has not got an official I/-HRM strategy. The 
staff receive in-house training when needed. 
 
Company C is a multinational corporation with its roots in Scandinavia. The company has a 
number of branches in Russia. There are no Scandinavian management or staff working at the 
local branch. At the Russian head office, management consists of a variety of nationalities. 
International education is common among the staff there. HR is an integrated part of the 
company’s global business strategy. The company states that it recruits globally, and that a 
well-integrated international workforce is key to its strategy. The company has an 
international assignment program for increased human resources mobility, and managers from 
emerging markets are starting to take more positions at HQ. A review of the company’s 
current job advertisements in Russia shows that knowledge in both Russian and English is 
required for practically all positions. The company has formal policies for multiple areas. 
These are adapted for the environment of every country the company is active in, which 
applies to Russia as well. One example is the code-of-conduct and anti-corruption 
instructions, which is followed by extensive training and control in countries where the risk of 
corruption is deemed high. Training is arranged in different countries depending on the job of 
the employee. Much of the training received by the Murmansk staff is conducted online or 
personally by top managers. There is no consistent programme of the Murmansk staff that 
involves training at HQ. 
                                                          
3
 European Union definition by headcount 
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Company D is the branch of a Norwegian company. The branch employs less than 10 
employees. With the Norwegian business included, the company can be defined as small by 
headcount.
4
 The branch deals with sales to the Russian market. The company has not got an 
official HR strategy. The general director of the company is Norwegian and has long 
experience of trading with Russian companies. He moved to Russia in the late 1990’s to 
manage the export from his Norwegian company more closely. He stayed there for a long 
time and is, according to the respondent, quite familiar with Russian culture. A few years ago 
he changed the direction of the business and opened a few geographical branches. The reason 
for the general director hiring host country nationals to manage the Russian branch was 
primarily a question of time and capacity (him needing to manage the Norwegian branch) 
rather than cultural and/or linguistic inadequacies, according to the respondent.   
Respondent A works as a coordinator and is a Russian national who has previously studied 
and worked (for the parent company) in Norway. She states that this experience together with 
her knowledge of Russian language and culture was seen as a big advantage when she started 
working in the Murmansk branch of the company. 
 
Respondent B is the founder and owner of a local company, and is a West-European third-
country national (TCN) with experience of running business in Norway. He runs the business 
from Murmansk since more than 10 years, and there is no middle manager in the company. 
He is fluent in his mother tongue, English and Norwegian, and has basic knowledge of the 
Russian language.  
 
Respondent C works as a coordinator for the company and is a Russian national. She has 
previous experience of working for Russian companies. In previous jobs, she has had many 
contacts with foreign clients. 
Respondent D is the deputy director of the Murmansk branch of the company, and is a 
Russian national. He has a degree in International Business and views working in the 
company as a good opportunity to make use of his education. He previously ran his own 
business in Russia. 
                                                          
4
 50 employees or less (European Union definition) 
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4.1.1 HRM policies and practices 
Previous international experience: Neither of the respondents claimed that previous 
experience of having worked abroad, or for a foreign company, was demanded or expected of 
employees. Two of the respondents suggested that this is because it is hard to find people with 
international experience in Murmansk, as many young and educated people leave for bigger 
Russian cities or go abroad. Recruiting foreigners to Murmansk has also proved to be difficult 
for many of the foreign companies in the town, one respondent stated. One of the companies 
had non-Russians in their staff in Murmansk, this being an effort to match employees against 
a customer segment. The other three had no Norwegians in the local management, or among 
staff. Another account was that a Norwegian workforce is not needed since the operations at 
the Russian branch are directed at the Russian market.  
Language: All of the respondents stated that generally, proficiency in English is required of 
employees at their companies. Reasons stated for this are: that all internal documents are 
written in both languages; the needs of external communications and marketing; customer 
contact, and internal communications. One of answers suggests that Russian skills is 
something that has more cultural than practical importance, i.e. it is important for 
Scandinavian/foreign managers in Russia to learn some Russian; not so much for the purpose 
of carrying out specific tasks, but as a way of showing respect to the employees. By doing 
that, they get respect in return. Another view is that while Russian can be used for “chit-chat”, 
English has to be the common work language, the reasoning for this being that everyone is 
“on the same level” when speaking a second language instead of their native tongue. 
Speaking English also helps in establishing a certain distance, to mark employer-employee 
relations. Another view was that it doesn’t matter if management speaks Russian or not, since 
everyone in the company speaks English. Of Norwegian managers in Murmansk, one of the 
respondents noted that some of them do not speak Russian at all (on principle) while some are 
trying to learn. One respondent argued that it is more important to understand the culture and 
the history than the language.  There was also an account of a Norwegian manager who 
worked for a company in Murmansk some time ago, who spoke Russian well, but not well 
enough to be on the same level as native speakers. This was seen as a weakness by the 
employees. 
Rewards: All of the companies used the same reward system as they do in Scandinavia. One 
company has a central reward system that calculates all bonuses; another has fixed salaries 
and some bonuses that are not given regularly, but when something has gone unexpectedly 
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well; one company has got bonuses for certain category of staff and one company does not 
have a bonus system, at least not for employees.  
Subsidiary autonomy: None of the respondents whose companies are also established in 
other companies expressed that the Russian part of the company is too strongly controlled by 
HQ. One respondent expressed the following: 
 “The management [at the Russian branch] emphasises that “We are a Russian company, Russian rules have to 
apply here”. At the same time, an overall management philosophy within the company is to encourage 
employees to think freely.  This is emphasised here, because it’s a little bit harder in Russia than in Norway to 
make employees take initiatives, generally they are more used to following directives.”  
Another account shows a great deal of subsidiary autonomy, which is followed by inclusive 
and democratic procedures within the subsidiary:  
“Usually, the [parent company] director comes to visit for a while and we will split the work load between each 
other and then we give reports along the process. We actually include all of the staff here when discussing 
budget. The director asks us to put up a number of points for internal discussion after approval is given, or at 
least our points are always taken into consideration. This is really democratic and marks a big difference 
between European and Russian management style. All of the staff can contact the director directly.” 
4.1.2 Cultural values and management 
Differences in mentality:  All four respondents agreed that there is a difference in mentality 
between Russians and Scandinavians, in general terms. Differences in the education system 
carries implications for the way people think in the workplace. Scandinavians are taught to 
think free and discuss different topics/phenomena at university, while Russian education is 
focused around very clear assignments in which students are expected to summarise rather 
than add their own perspectives. One respondent notes that political events often get discussed 
in a Scandinavian working place while this is not usually the case among Russians. One of the 
respondents did not see any specific obstacles or reoccurring points of complication of 
Russian-Scandinavian workplace cooperation. Another account was that mentality differences 
can lead to problems during the first few months, but that experience in the company is that 
people soon find a way of working together. Two of the respondents stated that the mentality 
is the biggest point of difference between Russians and Scandinavians. 
Russian attitudes to working for a Scandinavian company: Scandinavian companies are 
associated with modernity, reliability (especially if they are big), a relaxed atmosphere and 
openness. There is less tension in Scandinavian companies than in Russian, and the relaxed 
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atmosphere appeals to employees. One respondent mentioned that friends and acquaintances 
who work for (big) Russian companies have expressed that people are often under pressure 
from strict systems and strict orders.  Of Russian companies, one statement was that there is 
usually more paperwork and that systems are less efficient (with the exception of some bigger 
Russian companies). 
Scandinavian management style: Scandinavian management style is associated with 
flexibility and delegation of responsibility: the general direction is stated, but direct orders are 
rarely given; democracy: encouraging openness, initiatives and participation; and finally, 
clear procedures, as explained by one of the respondents: 
“All the staff are properly trained for their position and know what to do in the day-to-day job. In Russia, those 
procedures are not always so clear. Usually the boss just gives orders, and there is no system [for coaching and 
clearing questions that might occur in the process]” 
One respondent stated that the company uses a work procedure system, and that all employees 
across the organisation follow the fixed procedures of it. Because of this, the staff rarely need 
orders, according to the respondent. If some issues need to be discussed and decisions need to 
be taken, there is a meeting and the well-being of the staff is always taken into consideration.  
Most of the respondents state that Russian staff in their companies generally appreciate the 
listed management traits. One view expressed was that everybody (regardless of nationality) 
wants to be understood by their colleagues and other people, and that this is central in 
Western management styles: enabling trust, thus allowing people to open up to others. 
Another respondent stated that not all Russian staff appreciate this type of leadership, because 
it forces them to take initiative and responsibility. None of the respondents mentioned any 
negative sides of Scandinavian management present in their companies. When asked about 
the more negative views on Scandinavian management, the respondents stated that Russian 
employees think that Scandinavian managers are too weak and talk too much, and that 
Russians (especially businessmen) think that they are less clever than themselves, and easily 
fooled. One respondent states that the latter was a prevalent attitude especially in the 1990’s, 
and a Norwegian manager at one of the companies had experienced it. The respondent argued 
that it is a question of prejudice which comes from people who have never worked in a non-




“Some time ago when foreign leaders began to start up businesses here, Russians felt that the foreign bosses 
came here telling them what to do. The reaction was: ”We are a big country with a long history, we know how to 
manage things, don’t come here telling us what to do!” 
Russian employees: One respondent stated that views on training and career advancement 
are similar among employees on the Norwegian and the Russian side of the company. The 
majority of respondents state that Russian staff, in general, are less independent than 
Scandinavians. One respondent claimed that the first question when a mistake is made is 
“Who’s guilty?” and that, in consequence, people do not like to think independently or take 
responsibility.  Key qualities such as good communication skills and service-mindedness 
towards customers cannot be taken for granted in Russia. Another view was that Russian staff 
are not generally very positive towards training or willing to learn, and added that this is a 
matter of convenience:  all people are lazy, and it is easier to keep on doing things in the way 
they have always been done.  Another explanation is that in general, Russians are tired of 
change after a century of many rough turns. One of the respondents offers an explanation on 
why these attitudes are present in some Russians:  
“In Russia, the whole system used to be really directive, for every position they had specific instructions. That’s 
why a lot of people who are in their 60’s, 50’s and late 40’s are scared of doing any jobs they aren’t used to. 
They are absolutely not flexible. They used to works in “frames”: it’s a question of psychology (…) It’s a long 
way to go [with older generations of the Russian workforce], it’s easier with young people. Times are changing, 
the young people had to get used to it and can see the advantages. But for older people it’s hard, and they 
actually don’t want change. A lot of times, productivity is low because of bad management. There are many 
people who have a lot of potential, but they just don’t know how to use it. That’s why Russians need to build up 
new relations between management and employees. The level of education is very high, but Russians don’t use 
it. People are theoretically taught, but not practically. They are often scared of taking responsibility, from fear of 
being punished by their bosses.” 
Motivational factors: One respondent states that “good money” is more important to 
Russians than to Scandinavians. People often have low basic salaries, which makes the 
opportunity of getting bonuses attractive to Russians. All in all, bonuses in addition to fixed 
salaries are more common in Russia. The lack of a bonus system was one of the few points of 
irritation among employees in one of the companies, and was viewed as peculiar as it is 
commonplace in Russian companies in the industry. This was seen as a point that the top 
management could consider implementing to motivate the Russian staff.  
Russian management style: Associated traits are authoritarian leadership style, direct orders, 
distrust of employees, and lack of clear procedures. One respondent argued that a problem 
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with Russian managers is that they do not trust people when it comes to business, but spend a 
lot of time double-checking details instead of doing business. Very rarely Russian companies 
will organise training to make people understand that they can do a lot of different tasks. 
Another point was that a big problem with older Russian leaders is that they don’t always 
speak English.  Therefore, they cannot read international magazines and pick up new trends in 
business/management research. One respondent described the typical Russian manager as 
someone with an authoritarian attitude who just gives strict orders, and is viewed as “the big 
boss” and “a very important person”. Another respondent found no positive traits of Russian 
management style, and argued that it is also more convenient to do business “European-
style”.  
4.2 The business support organisation  
SIVA (Selskapet for industrivekst, in English: The industrial development corporation of 
Norway) is a state-owned Norwegian company under the Ministry on Trade and Industry with 
the main purpose of  “developing strong regional and local industrial clusters through 
ownership in infrastructure, investment and knowledge networks as well as innovation 
centres” and to create conditions for innovation throughout the country. The company’s two 
principal business areas are real estate and innovation (SIVA, n.d.). SIVA also has a group of 
subsidiaries abroad, whose overriding goal is to support internationalisation processes of 
Norwegian companies. This is done mainly through development of business parks, logistics 
centres and business incubators in various countries: the key markets being North-West 
Russia, the Balkans and the Baltics. SIVAs International activity was first initiated as part of 
the Russian-Norwegian Barents cooperation agreement in 1993 (SIVA, n.d.). The Russian 
branch, SIVAs first international establishment, came into being in 1999 and is located in the 
town of Murmansk, approximately 250 kilometres from the Norwegian border.  
According to the company website, SIVA is located in North-West Russia as “part of the 
Norwegian High North policy” (Sivaim.no, 2013). In Murmansk, SIVA offers the following 
so called soft landing services: a business train (study trips for Norwegian and Russian 
companies considering establishment on the opposite side of the Barents region), reasonably 
priced office space with shared facility services in the business park, a Russian-Norwegian 
business incubator, an online business news bulletin and a logistics centre which is co-owned 
with Innovation Norway. In addition to helping Norwegian companies, SIVA actively 
supports foreign investment in North-West Russia: for example through participation in FIBA 
(foreign investors’ business association) and NBA (Norwegian Business Association) which 
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are both independent business societies; takes part in various activities (fairs, information 
days etc.) that can raise the profile of the region; supports Russian businesses seeking to 
export to, or establish themselves, in Norway: a consequence of feedback from a survey 
conducted in 2011, in which findings where that Norwegian companies with interest in the 
Russian market were seeking more cooperation and sharing of knowledge and experiences 
with Russian businesses in Norway (Technoparknor, 2011). Presently, SIVA houses 41 
tenants in their business park (Polar Star Innovation Centre). 31 companies solely rent office 
space, while the remaining 10 are also incubated. 7 of these are Norwegian, while Russian 
companies constitute the majority of the unincubated tenants presently (SIVA, 2013)  
The SIVA respondent is Mr. Geir Reiersen, vice president of SIVA International. He is a 
Norwegian national and works primarily in Trondheim, Norway (the location of SIVAs head 
office) and in Murmansk, and has been with the company ever since the Murmansk office 
first opened. He is fluent in Norwegian and English, and has basic knowledge of the Russian 
language.  
4.2.1  Internationalisation strategies 
The respondent claims that Norwegian companies usually go to Russia first and then start to 
shape the strategy for their Russian venture. He argues that they are correct in doing so, as 
goals can be constructed beforehand, but strategies have to be created on location. Their plans 
of going to Russia is often a business secret, i.e. there is very little visible activity on the 
Norwegian side. However, the respondent also notes that the companies who go to Murmansk 
are often naïve, and that their strategies are in general very weak. The companies don’t “do 
their homework” and can only be said to have a fail and error strategy.  
Reasons for choosing to internationalise in North-West Russian has changed, according to the 
respondent. Ten years ago, Norwegian business in Murmansk was highly based on 
governmental affirmative action programs, but Norwegian companies that establish 
themselves in Murmansk today are more internationalised than before, and come not only 
from the North of Norway. The North-Western market is also growing, and is large (0,5 
million people) by Northern  Scandinavian terms. However, the companies who go to 
Murmansk only do it if there is a demand in the local market, nobody goes to Murmansk as 
the first step in entering the Russian market. According to Mr. Reiersen, the difference 
between Norwegian companies who go to Murmansk and those who go to for example 
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Moscow or Saint Petersburg, is that the latter are usually already internationalised. They have 
strategies for their Russian venture, unlike many of the companies who consider Murmansk. 
4.2.2 IHRM strategies 
Preparations: In general, Norwegian companies don’t consider cultural differences as 
something that might become a challenge, the respondent claims. When they look for staff to 
start the Russian venture, the first priority is language skills. If they speak English, they are 
seen as being qualified. Only at a later point, when problems do occur due to lack of cultural 
understanding, the companies start requiring other skills. According to Mr. Reiersen, the 
majority of the companies understood in time that it’s better for them to get closer to the 
Russian ways of thinking and doing things, than to expect Russian to staff adapt to Norwegian 
ways. The respondent mentions how one of the bigger Norwegian companies in Murmansk 
have Russian-born staff who have worked in the Norwegian parent company for 15-20 years, 
whom they could ‘send over’ to start up a Russian venture if they like. Mr. Reiersen argues 
that this strategy does not guarantee cross-cultural competence, since Russia has gone through 
such rapid changes during the last decades that even Russians have to learn to know the 
country again if they have lived abroad for long.  
Norwegian managers: The trend is that more Norwegian companies start are starting to 
choose Russian managers (who have good language skills), but that the ratio is approximately 
50/50 between Russians and Scandinavians today. While it is not easy to attract Norwegian 
managers to Murmansk, but according to the respondent, the key challenge for the companies 
is to create systems for maintaining a high level of communication between the Russian and 
the Norwegian unit, and make them work together in a more practical sense. Usually, 
companies send a Norwegian over to set this up: e.g. routines, IT systems, financial reporting. 
When these things are in order, the Norwegians step back and work to maintain good 
communication with frequent status reports. Norwegians are thus used mostly as management 
facilitators, rather than to run the Russian venture.  
Industry specifics: It is becoming increasingly difficult to find young well-educated staff in 
Murmansk, as many move to the bigger cities where wages are higher. Mr. Reiersen argues 
that it is easier to find ‘Western’-minded staff in knowledge-intense industries, whch are also 
often based around team-work. When it comes to unqualified jobs such as for example shop 
attendants, employees only to what they are told to and what they are paid for. The respondent 
notes that companies might have to go to Moscow or Saint Petersburg to recruit for example 
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highly qualified business leaders, IT staff and laywers. According to the respondent, 
Norwegian companies don’t consider this opportunity as often as they should. However, there 
are a couple of local recruiting agencies in Murmansk, from which SIVA themselves have 
recruited at least three employees. For bigger recruitment companies, the market is limited.  
Language: The respondent argues that, ideally, Norwegian managers should learn to master 
Russian well enough to use it as a work language, although remarks that lack of Russian 
language skills hasn’t been a big problem for Norwegian companies in Russia so far and that 
it’s natural to use English as the work language in a multi-lingual company. Like the company 
respondents, he argues that it is vastly more important that managers understand the culture 
than master the language, and mentions that there are many managers who speak excellent 
Russian but who don’t understand the culture. Mr. Reiersen concludes by stating that if one 
understands the language but not the culture, one will understand that actions are made and 
decisions taken, but one will not understand why.  
Norwegian managers in Murmansk usually take classes in Russian once they go to 
Murmansk, but that the outcomes are sometimes meagre; not because of the quality of the 
course, but because language is not prioritised.  Regarding Russian language skills, it is more 
common for companies to establish contact with Russian exchange students in Norway, and 
make sure that these learn to speak Norwegian (and English). The advantage to this ‘reversed’ 
method is that these already know Russian language and culture. English skills are expected 
in Russian staff depending on the needs of the business. Russian staff are not expected to 
speak English in the day-to-day business in companies that are directed towards the local 
market, the respondent claims, but argues that being able to discuss critical issues without an 
interpreter is a necessity, and a certain level of English proficiency is thus needed. 
4.2.1 Cultural values and management 
Differences in mentality: Mr. Reiersen states that the mentality difference is considerably 
less apparent today than when SIVA first opened in Murmansk. However, the respondent 
argues that one can never get away from these differences by hiring only young Russians with 
a more ‘Western’ or ‘International’ sort of mind-set. Members of the two cultures can look 
and act the same on the surface, but cultural differences are ingrained. Still, Mr. Reiersen 
doesn’t view mentality differences as significant in the Scandinavian-Russian context: they 
exist in every country, and even within countries like Norway and Sweden. Cultural 
differences are there whether we want it or not, and can only be facilitated to a certain 
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amount. Due to this, Scandinavian companies should never seek to implement a Scandinavian 
mentality in Russian companies, the respondent concludes. 
Russian management: According to the respondent, there is a new generation of Russian 
managers who focus strongly on costs and efficiency. Management in the bigger Russian 
cities it is very result-oriented. They are coming closer to an Anglo-Saxon style of 
management, Mr. Reiersen states. This demands a flat organisation since it is not efficient to 
have a line of people who control that the next person does his job, like in Soviet style 
management. This new generation of Russian managers are more likely to listen to the views 
of employees before they make a decision, unlike in the old system in which employees were 
barely allowed to speak to top management. 
Business culture: Like the mentality, the Russian business culture has changed during the 
last two decades. Mr. Reiersen describes how statistics no longer show that you lose more 
money selling to Russian customers than to domestic customers for example. The most 
dominant feature is that personal relationships are Alfa and Omega in the Russian market. 
The respondent reasons that there are some basic business culture obstacles that companies 
encounter in every country, e.g. different rules for audit. Mr. Reiersen argues that companies 
are more challenges by at first ‘invisible’ structural problems. These can be related to cultural 
differences, or even downright protectionism. The respondent claims that it might be a better 
strategy to have both local and foreign ownership than to come in as a Norwegian company 
and aggressively try to capture market shares, as politics have a greater deal of influence than 
in Scandinavia, where success is determined by price and quality rather than nationality. 
There are hidden actors with a great deal of power that influence business, and entrepreneur 
might meet obstacles the have a hard time understanding, Mr. Reiersen argues. However, 
people in the North-West of Russia are hugely positive to foreign direct investment (FDI): 95 
% thought that FDI in the region beneficial when SIVA did a survey among people in 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, according to the respondent.  
4.2.3 The role of the internationalisation support organisation 
Mr. Reiersen reasons that SIVA are not paying as much attention to cultural distance and 
IHRM as perhaps necessary. SIVA sometimes fail to stop companies and inform them of 
areas that might become problematic or provide challenges, cultural IHRM being one of 
them. In that sense, SIVA is not being pro-active, but can act as a sounding board when 
problems do occur, according to the respondent. However, earlier this year SIVA had a 
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gathering together with a few of the business associations in Murmansk where the topic of 
cross-cultural management was discussed. It was decided that leadership in a cross-cultural 
(Norwegian-Russian) setting, is of immense importance, and should be a focal point at 
meetings henceforth. The respondent argues that cross-cultural management in Russia is not a 
topic that can be covered on information meetings for Norwegian companies who are 
considering the Russian market. At this stage in the process, SIVA informs companies of the 
more superficial layers of business culture, i.e. the mentioned differences in audit. Mr. 
Reiersen argues that the deeper layers of Russian culture can only be explained by people 
who are Russian or have lived in Russia, and that they have to possess pedagogical skills to 
convey it. This is not reckoned as a fitting feature at an early stage of planning for a foreign 
venture.  
Supporting SMEs: The respondent argues that smaller companies don’t have enough 
administrative resources to plan and make strategies like the bigger companies can, and that 
they sometimes have to take things as they come. Mr. Reiersen states that many of the smaller 
Norwegian companies learn to handle the Russian environment eventually, but that they 
struggle in the beginning. However, the respondent argues that the SMEs partly have 
themselves to blame for this: “It’s some sort of ‘genetic failure’ among Norwegian 
companies: they don’t accept help. They want to gain the experiences by themselves”.  
Mr. Reiersen mentions how the Swedish strategy [from the equivalent of SIVA] is 
deliberately not to assist SMEs who want to go to Russia, as they don’t have enough 
resources to tackle the obstacles they are likely to face. While the respondent understands the 
logic behind this strategy, he reasons that they will try anyway, which marks a challenge for a 
business support organisation such as SIVA. Mr. Reiersen mentions internal factors that 
hamper SME support: it is difficult for SIVA to create a system for helping them, and there 
aren’t enough financial resources to re-educate those who have tried and failed. Also, there is 
limited interest from the companies in receiving help, they don’t use the so-called soft landing 
services, e.g. the business incubator, that SIVA can offer, according to the respondent. The 
companies in Murmansk don’t see the point in applying theories and evidence from academia 
to their business plans. There is no culture for this in Russia, except for Moscow, and the 
companies who engage with business incubators there are bound for success anyway, Mr. 
Reiersen states.  
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Mentorship programmes: Initiating mentorship programmes between companies who are 
established in Russia and those who are planning for entry is one way of spreading 
knowledge. This has been on SIVA’s agenda for a long time. According to the respondent, the 
whole purpose in setting up SIVA was to go in and take the risk, since companies didn’t trust 
Russian office landlords for example. Mr. Reiersen argues that companies look at the 
knowledge they’ve acquired from their Russian venture as a strategic advantage that they 
don’t want to share.  
Innovation programmes: One of SIVAs support areas are innovation. The innovation 
programmes that SIVA and Innovation Norway are instrumental in shaping are – according to 
the respondent - also a way of bringing the necessary cultural competence into a Norwegian 
company, as these put together Norwegian and Russian companies in partnerships. Thus, the 
Russian company brings an understanding of Russian culture while the Norwegian company 
understands Scandinavian culture, and these perspectives are put together. Mr. Reiersen 
argues that this is a more robust strategy, and that it is time for foreign companies to consider 
Russian joint ventures again as “what has been stolen in Russia has been stolen” [referring to 
periods in the 1990’s and 2000’s when IJVs were a popular means of entering the Russian 
market].  
Suggestions for improvement: The respondent states that while SIVA can’t arrange training, 
they can convey contacts to consultants (in Murmansk) who have competencies in cross-
cultural management and SIHRM.  Another suggestion is that business support organisations 
in the Nordic countries can go together, agree that lack of cultural awareness is a possible 
problem, and arrange funding for cross-cultural competency training. Again, the respondent 
notes lack of interest from companies as something that prevents this from happening, and 
argues that they don’t realise that lack of cross-cultural competence can be a problem until 
they have it. He reiterates that companies shouldn’t form their strategies before they come to 
Russia and know the obstacles, but suggests that they need to become better at consulting help 
in forming strategies once they’re there.   
5. Analysis 
The two research questions that have to be answered in order to fulfil the purpose of this 
thesis (1) What IHRM strategies can be found in Scandinavian companies who have entered 
the Russian market, and in which ways does cultural distance influence the strategies?, and 
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(2) How can an internationalisation support organisation inform the process of developing 
IHRM strategies in these companies? 
The following part will provide a discussion of these questions based on the connection 
between the findings of the studies and its theoretical framework.  
5.1 Internationalisation strategies 
First, the internationalisation strategies have to be mapped out. This will bring a background 
to the IHRM strategies. Arguably, Norwegian companies in Murmansk are generally not born 
globals but rather follow the internationalisation patterns of the companies that the Uppsala 
model is based on. For companies in the Northern parts of Scandinavia, North-West Russia is 
the most geographically close international market, which makes it a natural choice according 
to the model. However, the companies do experience high cultural distance, which they are 
not always prepared for. The SIVA respondent’s answers suggest that Norwegian companies 
who internationalise in Murmansk generally don’t have well-prepared strategies. The entry on 
the North-West Russian market is often the first and last international venture for the 
companies, which is not a sign of a born global company. In this respect, they also differ from 
the Uppsala model of internationalisation, as the cross-cultural competence that they 
hopefully gain in Murmansk is not used for further phases of gradual internationalisation; not 
even to the rest of Russia, according to the SIVA respondent.  
5.2 IHRM strategies 
 The picture that emerges from the interview with the SIVA respondent is that the companies 
generally don’t have specific HRM strategies for the Russian venture, which is no wonder as 
many of them only form ad-hoc strategies once they arrive. The SIVA respondent expresses 
concern over the ignorance among Norwegian companies regarding cultural differences. At 
the same time, he states that they can’t form their strategies in Norway; they have to be 
formed in Murmansk when the company has identified some of the opportunities and the 
threats. Therefore it’s no point making the HRM strategy beforehand either.  One of the 
bigger Norwegian companies in Murmansk have Russian long-time staff employed in 
Norway. However, this is not necessarily connected to a long-term strategy of eventually 
entering the Russian market. It’s more likely a natural consequence of proximity to the border 
coupled with the huge influx of Russian students at Norwegian universities. One of the 
respondents remarks how responsibility is divided between the Norwegian parent company 
and the Russian branch by the Norwegian manager setting general goals for the Russian 
branch and then letting them decide how to pursue these. Budgets are discussed together, and 
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all of the staff are involved in this process. This is arguably a very democratic approach, far 
from the hierarchical style preferred in Russia as reported by Hofstede and others. Another 
respondent mentions how the company uses a computer work system which makes ‘giving 
orders’ unnecessary. This showcases management convergence preceded by technical 
convergence. As all of the staff have to follow the system independent of nationality, the 
system becomes a ‘culturally neutral’ manager.  
International orientations: The sampled companies employ almost exclusively Russian 
staff, and – with the exception of one – Russian managers. This suggests that they have a 
polycentric approach as described by Heenan and Pearlmutter. Subsidiary control is not 
experienced as too strict, instead the Scandinavian approach of decentralising decisions is 
used. This is also in line with the polycentric approach. A level of expatriate management is 
present, as Norwegian managers make up about 50 % according to the SIVA respondent. The 
purpose of sending a Norwegian manager to start up the Russian manager is often to set up 
robust communication systems between the Norwegian company and its Russian branch, 
according to the SIVA respondent. This is arguably a way of controlling and coordinating the 
branch, albeit through a decentralised ‘democratic’ way typical of Scandinavian management 
as reported by the respondents. One of the companies partially uses inpatriation as they send 
Russian staff for training in the Norwegian parent company. The company also employs a 
native Russian who has lived and worked in Norway. This is a IHRM trace that fosters cross-
cultural awareness and flexibility, as mentioned in chapter 3.5.3.  
None of the companies express a geocentric approach, which is far from surprising. The 
companies featured are directed at either cross-border services between Norway and Russia, 
or to the local market. They don’t come to Murmansk as a step in a process of further 
internationalisation. This makes a geocentric orientation unfit for their state of 
internationalisation according to the theoretical framework in this study, as this orientation is 
connected to the ‘Maturity phase’ (Adler & Ghadar, 1992) and to MNCs. Although the MNC 
can be said to have this approach in general, the Murmansk office is only one of its many 
Russian branches, and consists of only Russian staff. This suggests that it’s difficult to attract 
foreigners to Murmansk, but also that a geocentric orientation doesn’t necessarily expand to 
the ‘far ends’ of the organisation, even if it’s present in the strategically important parts of it.  
According to the SIVA respondent, Norwegian managers are not generally vary familiar with 
Russian culture and language when they arrive. This might be explained by the Murmansk 
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venture being a ‘one-time internationalisation’, which then serves to explain why the 
companies might not have the incentives to acquire language skills and cultural knowledge.  
None of the sampled companies focus heavily on language skills (i.e. Russian) and cultural 
awareness as suggested that a company with a polycentric orientation – and a company in the 
2
nd
 phase ‘internationalisation and growth’ of the Adler and Ghadar framework - does. This 
suggests that the companies find ways of adapting the company to the local environment 
while not having to adapt their management styles, as their Russian employees are active in 
the ‘translation’ process. 
5.3 Cultural values and management – the effect on strategies 
Mentality difference: The findings echo the cultural values research in that there is a 
mentality difference between Scandinavians and Russians. However, the Russian respondents 
don’t describe this difference as noticeable in them or the companies they work for. The non-
Russian respondents emphasise the mentality difference more strongly. The SIVA respondent 
claims that many Norwegian companies realise that it’s better that they change to fit Russian 
culture than the other way around. On the contrary, it seems that the companies can find staff 
who possess a rather similar mentality as they themselves. Thus, the companies can get 
around this aspect if they can find Russian staff who can ‘translate’ a Scandinavian 
management style to the needs of the local context. Among Russians, the findings suggest that 
there is a mentality difference between (1) older and younger generations, and (2) unqualified 
and qualified workforce. The younger generations, especially those working in knowledge-
intense industries are more likely to adopt a mind-set that could be labelled as verging on 
‘International’ or ‘Western’. The Russian respondents participating belong to this category in 
terms of both age and level of education. They also work for Scandinavian companies, which 
suggests that this management style appeals to them. According to the initiators of the 
GLOBE project, cultural values can be distinguished by asking people what management 
traits they embrace. The respondents distance themselves from the ‘typical’ Russian 
management behaviour. By this, and their positive remarks of Scandinavian management, 
they showcase belief in democracy, participation, flat hierarchies and openness. The working 
procedures they describe are not different from what could be expected in many Scandinavian 
companies. This gives support to convergence theory. 
Scandinavian and Russian management: All of the company respondents, Russians as well 
as non-Russians, have a positive view of Scandinavian management. When asked to describe 
‘typical’ features, they associate it with modernity, flexibility, democracy, a relaxed 
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atmosphere, openness and efficiency. However, two respondents noted that not all Russian 
staff appreciate this style, as they are also expected to take initiatives. The respondents 
suggest that these are usually older people who are used to working ‘in frames’ as one 
respondent calls it, and who don’t want to change. This serves to show that there is a division 
between the management trait embraced among older and younger people, as with the 
mentality difference. According to the initiators of the GLOBE project, this goes hand in 
hand, as there is a strong relationship between cultural values and the management styles 
embraced. None of the respondents express great concern over potential incompatibility of the 
‘old’ style Russian values and the management styles used in their companies, however. 
Russian management: The respondents contrast their views on Scandinavian management to 
Russian management, which is described as typically inefficient, authoritative and distrustful 
of employees. The respondents were not asked specifically if there are any other Russian 
management trends, but no positive remarks about Russian management were made. Rather, 
the Russian traits were seen as inhibiting good leadership and job satisfaction, and put in 
contrast to Scandinavian traits. One of the company respondents makes a distinction between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ management style, a distinction that is made by the SIVA respondent 
as well. The ‘new’ style was however only described in terms of what it seeks to emulate, i.e. 
‘Western’ or ‘European’ management. There are no specifically Russian features that 
distinguish this emerging management style from others. While some of the respondents use 
terms such as ‘Western’ or ‘European’, none of the respondents refer to ‘Asian’ management 
when talking about Russian management, which implies that this style is difficult to link to 
other geographically defined management styles. The findings show that there is no wide-
spread Russian concept of modern Russian management, and strengthens Gilbert’s (2001) 
argument of Russian culture as something that is difficult to crystallise due to the 
overshadowing Soviet features.   
Industry specifics: The SIHRM framework of Schuler et al. lists both national/regional 
culture and industry specifics as external factors for consideration. Due to the difficulties in 
separating the ‘old’ Soviet cultural values from the more unclear new values – that are more 
similar to ‘Western’ ones – Scandinavian companies should perhaps not spend as much time 
on analysing the national cultural values of Russia. The findings of this study suggest that it’s 
easier to find staff who are less affected by a ‘Soviet’ mind-set in knowledge-intense 
industries. This inclines that companies should focus on finding a fit between its IHRM 
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strategy and the industry it’s active in. A pattern of different challenges for knowledge-intense 
and less knowledge-intense companies emerge: 
Companies in knowledge-intense industries can attract young Russians with higher level 
education: thus, it’s likelier that they can let convergence theory guide their strategies, and 
have more flexibility regarding which international orientation they possess. Their HRM 
strategies for the Russian venture can be linked to a domestic strategy as well as integrated 
with a global ditto. This gives these companies more flexibility in choosing how much cross-
cultural competence they want to acquire. However, the findings suggest that knowledge-
intense companies might have difficulties in finding key competencies for certain jobs in 
Murmansk. Here, they can either go the bigger Russian cities to recruit, or attract staff in the 
Norwegian parent company to the new branch. Both strategies demand planning beforehand, 
and the latter brings challenges since it implies cross-cultural mix in the workforce instead of 
the more common combination of foreign management and Russian staff. However, the 
language skills and the international mind-set common in knowledge-intense industries will 
make the cultural fit easier. Arguably, these companies can benefit from internationalisation 
support programmes if these can provide contacts with for example Russian universities and 
specialist recruitment agencies. If the companies are born globals, they don’t benefit as much 
from support programmes as from development programmes.  
 
On the other hand, companies in industries based on unqualified labour are likelier to come 
across staff who display ‘Soviet’ traits, such as only performing tasks that have been directly 
ordered. These companies will either have to put a lot of effort in socialisation or in control. 
The former will challenge the high degree of uncertainty avoidance, while the latter will force 
a change towards a hierarchic management style. Both of these demand a competent and 
flexible leader. The third option is to put time and effort in the recruitment process by actively 
looking for staff who possess a certain type of mentality. What these companies need to 
understand, is that this will likely be a challenge. 
Language: By the nature of it, research that focuses on cultural values view these, rather than 
language, as the determinants of cross-cultural success. In order to determine whether 
language is a cultural barrier, we must consult the findings. Neither the companies, nor SIVA, 
perceive language as a real barrier. Three of the respondents state that understanding Russian 
history and culture is considerably more important than understanding the language. Thus, not 
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learning to master Russian is not viewed as being connected to a lack of interest in, or 
understanding of, Russian culture. None of the respondents stated that language is a big 
problem, rather the findings suggest a pragmatic approach to this question. The pattern that 
emerges is that the purpose of language skills is two-fold: (1) Practical usage: acquiring 
advanced Russian so that it can replace English as common work language, and (2) Social 
usage: learning to recognize common Russian words and be able to speak a little bit.  
None of the company respondents seem to consider the first purpose necessary; the SIVA 
respondent states that it is desirable all though not important judging by experiences so far. 
English is viewed as being necessary for both internal and external communication. In one of 
the companies, all of the internal documents are in English as well as Russian. This can be a 
symptom of international integration, as typical of a company in the ‘maturity phase’. The 
conclusion from the company respondents as well as the SIVA respondent is that it is natural 
that English is spoken in international organisations. The latter thinks that fluency in Russian 
should be a long-term goal, but states that it hasn’t been a problem throughout the years. This 
suggests that the companies find ways of getting around the language barrier. One way is of 
course to hire staff, or at least a trustable manager, who is proficient in English and can run 
the business.  
However, for the group of Russians who have a high degree of uncertainty avoidance, the 
unknown represents something frightening. Learning how to communicate in Russian might 
take away some of the most obvious foreign features that make some Russians sceptical. One 
interesting ‘paradox’ here is the notion (as expressed in the findings) of speaking English to 
Russian employees in order to mark employer-employee hierarchy. This approach is arguably 
in line with the expectations of the staff who embrace the ‘old’ Russian management features, 
as they expect high power distance. As this also often also goes together with high levels of 
uncertainty avoidance, the approach might be less initially suitable. However, speaking 
English might be a strategy to simultaneously cater to the fact that they’re used to high power 
distance while also showing that they are expected to make an effort and take initiative. Thus, 
the strategy may on the surface strike one as rather ethno-centric, but is in fact also a way of 
adapting to the environment, and is therefore also true for a polycentric approach. 
 For the latter purpose, views differ. The ability to understand and speak a little bit is seen as a 
gesture, and as a sign of respect, by one of the respondents. Even though not mentioned by all 
of the respondents, this seems to be the more important purpose as perfect mastering of the 
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Russian language is considered almost unnecessary. In conclusion, language is not perceived 
as something that enhances cultural distance, nor is learning Russian viewed as a way of 
overcoming it. Cultural distance is obvious in that few Norwegians learn to master it: 
however, this is a mark of practical cultural distance rather than deeper, more psychological 
cultural distance. The reasons why the Norwegian managers don’t learn the Russian language 
are arguably that it’s not seen as necessary in practice, rather than that they do not care to 
understand Russian culture. This is also generally the way it’s perceived by the respondents.  
 
English is regarded as a natural choice of work-language, while Scandinavian managers are 
not expected to learn Russian, other than possibly a few phrases. However, there are arguably 
cultural codes embedded in language that the Norwegian managers will never access if they 
don’t take the time to learn it. Managers who have a long-term perspective on the Russian 
venture might benefit from investing time in this. Also, the results do not shower whether 
language is a barrier for horizontal cooperation, rather than management-staff vertical 
communication. As evident by the findings, few if any Norwegians are employed other than 
on management level in the Russian ventures. Also, the SIVA respondent mentions how IJVs 
and mergers might be more suitable foreign market entry modes than WOS’s. If the 
Scandinavian company doesn’t want to give the Russian partner full responsibility for HRM, 
they might need to understand the language that is used in the organisation. In conclusion, 
Scandinavian companies can run their business without Russian skills, but if a company seeks 
high level integration of the Scandinavian and the Russian business activities, learning to 
master the Russian language is beneficial. 
Result-based leadership: Elenkov (1998) warns not to make the mistake of assuming that 
any management traits are universal, referring to failure in implementing American 
management traits that do not work in Russia, since they do not reflect Russian national 
values. The basic idea of the divergence approach is not to take any risks in this matter. The 
company interviews do not give any explicit information on Scandinavian management traits 
that are best avoided when going into Russia. The SIVA interview gives support to the 
divergence approach, as the respondent says that members of the cultures can only understand 
each other to a certain degree. Instead one must focus on finding ways of working together, 
the respondent says. This pragmatic ‘hands on’ approach is arguably a good fit with result-
based management. The latter is based around figures and ‘hard facts’ and is usually seen as 
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typical of Anglo-American management style. Since Scandinavian management is also 
beginning to take more influences from this ‘tougher’ style, it is possible that result-based 
management should be considered for the Russian HRM strategy. The most clear answer of 
what the features of this ‘new’ Russian management style is, is that it is based on cutting costs 
and increasing efficiency. The SIVA-respondent compares it to Anglo-American management 
styles. Some of the Scandinavian companies in Murmansk have tried to introduce flat 
organisations by removing middle management and granting more decision freedom to 
employees. This “paralyses” Russian subsidiaries at first, and they experience that they get 
too much freedom of choice at once.  This is consistent with the trends noted in previous 
research. Fey (2001) as well as Gratchev (2002) found that performance-based management is 
becoming more popular in Russia, even if it is yet far from dominating in practice. The initial 
“paralysation” however suggests a connection to the high scores on Power distance and 
Uncertainty avoidance as reported previously. In this way, cultural distance affects the 
Norwegian company’s opportunities to choose a management style they are naturally 
comfortable with for the Russian venture. On the other hand, they will only need to be patient 
when introducing change. This is arguably true of management change in general. 
In the first stage of internationalisation, focus needs to be put on local adaption according to 
both Heenan and Pearlmutter and Adler and Ghadar. The SIVA respondent echoes this when 
mentioning that many of the companies realise in time that it’s better, and more realistic, that 
they change to fit the environment than the other way around. Except for the MNC, all of the 
companies are arguably in the first phase of internationalisation. Cultural distance does 
prevent the companies from fitting their IHRM strategies to the local environment. The 
companies don’t pay much attention to the cultural attribute of language, and act more like a 
company that seeks global efficiency by focusing on coordination of activities. Even though 
this might not be a stated IHRM strategy, the companies try to find Russian ‘translators’: staff 
who are used to, and react well do a Scandinavian style of management while simultaneously 
having the cultural skills – being Russian – necessary to deal with Russian staff who embrace 
‘old’ style values, understand market conditions, and who are native Russian speakers. 
Cultural distance is arguably thus avoided rather than dealt with. Even though few of the 
companies seem to plan on further activities, the integration of management practices is an 
efficient way of dealing with a foreign venture. Focus must then be put in the recruitment 
process in order to find good ‘translators’ and in setting up communication systems so that 
both decentralisation and control is achieved. However, the previous description relates to 
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knowledge-intense companies. More ‘traditional’ and less knowledge-intense companies are 
likely to be more affected by cultural distance. These companies will either have to put effort 
in close control or high socialisation of employees. They can either hire a manager who 
practices the ‘old’ Russian management style of hierarchic decision processes and detail 
control while simultaneously emphasising efficiency, or they can hire a manager who masters 
both styles of management and can initiate a change process. The findings as well as the 
theory suggests that moving towards a performance-based leadership might be a suitable 
approach for the Russian market. 
5.4 The effect of the support organisation 
There is yet to be an established link between participation in support programmes and 
SIHRM. The findings suggest that the companies have weak strategies in general, and that 
IHRM is not a prioritised area. The SIVA respondent notes how especially the SMEs often 
learn by time, but find it hard to adapt in the beginning. This is contrasted to how bigger 
companies – especially the ones who reach the Russian market in Saint Petersburg or Moscow 
– are more internationalised and have stronger strategies.  The fact that the governmental 
support organisation presently doesn’t offer support for the IHRM area is consistent with 
research, or more aptly, the lack of research that shows this connection. However, the reason 
why the support organisation doesn’t offer these services is because the companies don’t 
request them. This again proves that the companies’ internationalisation strategies are 
especially weak in the realm of IHRM. The findings suggest an awareness within the 
internationalisation support organisation that IHRM is an area that should be considered, but 
that the lack of initiative from the companies themselves makes it difficult for SIVA to help. 
All in all, providing strategic help for companies who lack both strategies and resources is 
deemed difficult by the respondent. The role of the support organisation is thus rather to 
facilitate improvement for companies who are already ‘on the way’ to make robust 
internationalisation strategies. The respondent mentions how SIVA can’t be responsible for 
re-educating companies who have not done well. He also recognises that companies’ lack of 
interest for the connection between business research and business in practice makes it more 
difficult to make them use the services in offer. Cultural distance is not viewed by the SIVA 
respondent as a subject that can’t be introduced at an early stage to companies who consider 
entry on the Russian market, as this subject is complicated and risks getting ‘lost in 
translation’. The internationalisation support organisation can thus not initiate an awareness of 
the possible impacts of cultural distance, but can support companies who experiences this. 
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However, the organisation does influence cross-cultural awareness through its innovation 
programmes by putting together Russian Norwegian partner companies. This is a pragmatic 
approach which looks at the internationalisation process in a holistic way as cross-cultural 
competence is – in fortunate cases – a consequence of combining financial resources and 
innovation. However, if the companies are not compatible they will not learn of each other’s 
cultures, which might mean that cultural distance is instead even more present in these 
organisations, as the Norwegian part will likely have less influence over HRM. While SIVA 
would like to initiate mentorship programmes, this is made impossible by the lack of 
information given by companies who are established in Russia. Since they normally don’t 
want to share the ‘strategic’ knowledge of understanding Russian culture, new companies 
won’t receive help by this form.  
6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter will provide answers to the research questions of this thesis: (1) What IHRM 
strategies can be found in Scandinavian companies who have entered the Russian market, and 
in which ways does cultural distance influence the strategies?, and (2) How can an 
internationalisation support organisation inform the process of developing IHRM strategies in 
these companies? 
6.1 What IHRM strategies can be found in Scandinavian companies who have 
entered the Russian market? 
The companies generally have rather weak strategies. Many of them do not have a strategy for 
either HRM or IHRM. However, Russian branches are generally granted a considerable 
amount of freedom. This is made possible by the Norwegian parent company setting up good 
communication systems that will enable them to have control over the branch through intense 
status reporting for example. They employ both Russian and Scandinavian managers, but 
employ almost exclusively Russian staff. Focus is not put on learning Russian among the 
Scandinavian leaders.  
6.2. In which ways does cultural distance influence the strategies? 
Many of the companies manage to avoid cultural distance by recruiting Russian managers and 
staff that don’t possess the ‘old’ Russian – or ‘Soviet’ – values. This gives them more 
flexibility in forming their IHRM strategies. However, this is only true for knowledge-intense 
companies, who are also arguably more likely to pick up on management research, more open 
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to cultural diversity, and possess a higher ability to acquire cross-cultural competence. The  
‘traditional’ companies that are less knowledge-intense are the ones that might have to be the 
most culturally sensitive, since they are likely to employ staff with cultural values that are 
rather unlike Scandinavian cultural values that affect work. This division of knowledge-
intense and less knowledge-.intense companies/industries shows that companies have to pay 
particular attention to the Russian staff they’ll need depending on their business area in order 
to find out how cultural distance is likely to impact on their room for IHRM strategies. 
6.3 How can an internationalisation support organisation inform the process of 
developing IHRM strategies in these companies? 
Arguably, the means by which the internationalisation support organisation can best help the 
companies is to arrange funding for cross-cultural training. This, however, can only be 
initiated after companies have shown interest. As knowledge-intense companies avoid 
cultural distance through employing ‘International’-minded staff and through designing 
robust communication systems instead, the interest might not be big enough among them. 
However, they might benefit from contacts with channels through which they can find the 
qualified staff they need, which is something the internationalisation support organisation can 
help with. As for the companies who are active in less knowledge-intense industries, the 
findings suggest that they are more in need of help in overcoming cultural distance, but they 
are also less interested in receiving help. In conclusion, the internationalisation support 
organisation can’t make companies think strategically around the possible impacts of cultural 
distance on management strategies, but they can provide support for the creation of IHRM 
strategies by connecting companies to consultants once the companies are in Russia and are 
facilitating their strategies. They can also raise awareness about cross-cultural management by 
discussing it at meetings, which might make Scandinavian business leaders in Murmansk 
decide to prioritise these issues more strongly in their own companies. 
 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
Part of the purpose of this study was to explore if there can be a link between 
internationalisation support organisations and IHRM strategies. The study did however not 
have the aim of asking companies themselves how they prioritise SIRHM when 
internationalising in culturally distant market, or what help they themselves argue that they 
could benefit from. Therefore, further studies should seek to investigate the problem from the 
companies’ view in order to possibly establish a link.  
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Another suggestion for further research is to investigate Scandinavian-Russian workplaces 
that have a clearer cross-cultural mix of staff, since these are arguably more affected by 
potential cultural distance than companies that consist almost exclusively of Russian staff.  
Appendices 
Interview guide: the companies 
 Do you have a Norwegian or Russian manager?  
 Are there mostly Russians or Norwegians in the staff? 
 Does your company have an official management philosophy? 
 What management values do you prefer? (If manager) how would you describe your 
own management?  
 What, in your view, are the main differences between ”typically” Russian and 
Norwegian styles of management? Pros and cons? How would you define 
management in this company? 
 How do staff in your company react to Scandinavian management, if it’s present? Are 
there any parts of it that don’t work well in toy work-place? 
 Where do you conduct training in the company?  
 How did the company handle the recruitment process when starting up in Russia? Did 
they employ only Russian people or Norwegians also? If Norwegian, what was their 
previous knowledge of Russian culture and language? If Russians, did the company 
require previous international/foreign company work experience of their employees?  
 What benefit programs/reward programmes do you have? 
 Are Russians and Norwegians in the company motivated by the same rewards? 
 Where do the decisions regarding human resource management get taken? In the 
Russian branch exclusively, or partly in Norway? 
 Do HR/management questions regularly get discussed with other Norwegian 
companies in Murmansk?   
 
Interview guide: SIVA 
 Except for the political incentives (e.g. the High North strategy), what are the current 
strategic reasons for Norwegian companies to enter the Russian market in Murmansk? 
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 How do Norwegian companies prepare for market entry in North-West Russia? Have 
they got robust strategies? What do they find critical? To what degree do they 
prioritise HRM in their strategies (if they have one)? 
 Do the companies usually choose Norwegian or Russian managers? 
 Do Norwegian companies want to bring Norwegian staff other than only managers? Is 
it hard to attract foreigners to Murmansk? 
 Are Norwegian companies good at changing their management strategies? 
 Considering that many well-educated people in Murmansk move to the bigger Russian 
cities, is it more difficult to find competent and internationally minded staff in 
Murmansk? 
 Is there a difference between industries, when it comes to finding Western- 
/International-minded employees? For example IT contra construction companies? 
 Do Norwegian companies use local recruiters in Murmansk? 
 Do you think that Norwegian managers should learn to master Russian well enough to 
use it as a work language? 
 Could SIVA help initiate language studies, for example by creating a group where 
classes are taken together with other Scandinavian business people? Or is it the 
responsibility of each company? 
 What is SIVAs role in helping companies incorporate cultural understanding in their 
strategies? Is it up to the companies? 
 Does SIVA arrange information meetings for interested companies in Norway as well 
as in Russia? If you have them in Norway, do you bring up culture? 
 Would some sort of mentorship programme with more experienced companies be 
possible? 
 Are HRM issues discussed within the informal network of Norwegian/other Western 
companies in Murmansk? 
 Are the bigger Norwegian companies better than the smaller ones at considering 
culture and language? 
 Has there been a change in business culture in Russia that has made it easier for 
foreign companies to trust Russian companies? 
 What are the biggest obstacles for Norwegian companies in Russia today: the ones 
that come first (like the business culture and business legislation) or the ones that 




 Has the mentality difference become less apparent since SIVA opened in Murmansk? 
How about the younger generation of Russians, who are often more International or 
‘Western’ minded? Can Norwegian companies escape the mentality difference by 
hiring only young Russians with this sort of mind-set? 
 Are there any traits in Scandinavian management that don’t work in Russia?  
 Do you think that decentralisation is a suitable approach in a country that is more used 
to strict hierarchies? 
 If we assume that there is one ‘old’ (Soviet style) and one ‘new’ style of Russian 
leadership, is there anything that separates the latter from ‘Western’ leadership? 
What would you wish that Norwegian companies would improve on regarding these 
questions, and what could SIVA 
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